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Introduction 
Many European governments have recently transformed their higher education 
systems. A key objective of the reforms was to modernize university governance 
in order to prepare universities for a more complex, international, and highly 
competitive environment. The starting point for this study is the assumption 
that reforms of university governance will have an impact on the university’s 
performance on various (local, national, and international) levels. 
In this contribution we want to picture the major themes and trends in the 
governance of three European higher education systems and discuss the relevance 
of the three cases for Poland. Governance, a highly contested, multi-dimensional 
and usually ill-defined concept, will be defined more fully below, but in short is 
about authority and rights and responsibilities of actors. It is about who decides 
when on what. 
Governance reforms in higher education have taken place at various levels 
and touch upon many different policy areas in higher education. On the macro 
(or system) level, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of higher 
education providers, the number of students enrolled, academics employed, and 
programs offered. 
On the meso (or intermediate) level, the traditional university governance model 
was placed under increasing political and economic pressure, facing strong criticism 
from a wide range of stakeholders. The traditional types of collegial governance 
were heavily criticized as an ineffective way of running a university, a lack of 
transparency and an undue focus on process instead of outcomes. In addition, 
it was stated that the 1990s model of university governance as “representative 
democracy” has failed to effectively respond to the needs of our post-industrial 
society and economy. At the same time, strong state regulations lost their public 
legitimacy or were replaced by the softer, more supervisory role of the state and 
a “steering at a distance” model of public policy. In Europe, this translated into 
the introduction of the New Public Management doctrine that in higher education 
led to changing modes of organizational steering (external governance) and 
internal governance of universities. On a micro level (i.e. the level of the individual 
university), the university as an organization was slowly transformed into a more 
tightly coupled and task-oriented organization, managed by a strong organizational 
leadership (Krucken 2011: 3-5). In other words, since the 1990s one may observe 
governance reforms in a number of European countries that can be characterized 
as “less government and more governance.” As stated in a recent survey of 
higher education Governance reforms in Europe (2008: 30): “Different countries 
have reformed higher education governance arrangements in different ways, to 
different extent and at different times and speeds and varying degrees of success.” 
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But Poland is clearly one of few exceptions. It has not undertaken any serious 
measures to challenge the well-rooted democratic model of university governance. 
For some analysts (Thieme 2009; OECD 2007a), this is a major reason behind the 
underperformance of Polish universities, as measured by low and unsatisfactory 
positions in almost all international rankings. On top of that, Poland has a poor 
record in research and in the country’s innovation outcomes, according to the 
Country Performance Index, based on the Shanghai Ranking (see: Aghion et al. 
2009). On the other hand, some modernization theorists, such as Immanuel 
Wallerstein, would claim that suspending serious reforms can also be rewarding 
for developing countries. The case of the latecomers’ advantage suggests that 
countries lagging behind with modernization might avoid a number of traps and 
mistakes made by “early birds.” Learning from successes but also the mistakes of 
others could be a huge advantage. By and large this report refers to the benefits of 
late arrival, as it draws lessons from higher education reforms in the Netherlands, 
Austria, and Portugal. By doing so, it identifies trends in public policy and 
institutional patterns of university governance that might be used as benchmarks 
for reforms of university governance in Poland. This study does not want to provide 
“ready to use” solutions for underperforming universities in Poland based on 
simplistic “copy and paste” policy transfer. To the contrary, it will elaborate in depth 
on governance reforms in three reference countries in order to:
(a) present common characteristics in public policy that go beyond any national 
context;
(b) offer a set of guidelines for institutional arrangements that can be translated 
into public policy and managerial practice. 
To avoid preaching to the converted, it will examine which aspects of policy 
changes in the reference countries have already been covered by the Polish law of 
higher education and how they work. Last but not the least, the model built on the 
analysis of reforms in Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal will be filtered though 
managerial experience of rectors, vice-rectors, and former rectors of universities in 
Poland. The study departs from the position that higher education reforms require 
taking into account both references to a global frame as well as consideration of 
national path dependency. Therefore, we want to know if the key (shared) aspects 
of international governance reforms can effectively address the major problems of 
Polish universities.
The report is structured as follows. The first section will elaborate on the theoretical 
and methodological foundation of the analysis, establishing research questions 
and presenting the way they will be addressed in the later stage. The second 
chapter is devoted to governance reforms in Dutch universities since the late 
1970s, with the major focus on the MUB governance reform in 1997. Section 
number three will explore a wide range of changes in Portuguese universities, in 
regards to democratization of higher education after the fall of the Salazar regime 
and several attempts to modernize university governance in Portugal. It will be 
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focused particularly on turbulences with the democratic model of university 
governance. The next chapter evaluates the transformation of Austrian universities 
from corporative to corporate organizations, paying special attention to a new 
model of university governance that has replaced the historically well-established 
Humboldtian model. In the fifth section, we want to identify common features of 
governance reforms in the three reference countries in order to put them in one 
analytical framework. Because the countries are so different in regards to higher 
education, we want to shed light on transnational patterns of policy change and 
a new type of institutional arrangement of university governance in the 21st 
century. These findings will help us to present a critical evaluation of the law of 
higher education in Poland in regards to university governance. In the sixth chapter 
— based on expert interviews — we try to answer the issues of:
 (1)  why the governance model of “representative democracy” is dominant in 
Poland;
 (2)  which aspects of university governance require fundamental change in Polish 
universities;
 (3)  to what extent the reforms deployed in Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal 
can (or cannot) serve as benchmarks for governance reforms in Polish 
universities. 
In addition, the chapter aims to provide some guidelines for a new university 
governance model and for the political process of implementing one in Poland. 
We fully understand that reforms can be inspired by an international framework of 
references but also need to take into account the specific academic traditions and 
institutional arrangements in Polish universities. 
Overall, the main task of the report is to provide solid guidelines for public policy in 
Poland that will help to develop a new university governance model to address the 
major problems of Polish university management by drawing from the experience of 
other countries. 
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1. The objectives, research 
questions, and design of the study
1.1. Literature review 
There is a wide range of literature on university governance. It has been mostly 
published in English, the language that heavily dominates the discipline of 
international research. University governance and management became buzzwords 
in the late 1980s with the advent of the concept of New Public Management 
(Pollitt, 1993). Since then, the number of published articles on university 
governance has mushroomed, discussing such themes as the changing nature of 
higher education, market-based relationships between the state and the university, 
and most importantly, the entrepreneurial models of university governance 
(e.g., Clark 1998; Williams 2003; de Boer, Enders, & Jongbloed 2009). Governance 
of higher education is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, but in this 
study we will use Eurydice’s definition of governance which refers to:
The formal and informal exercise of authority under laws, policies, and rules 
that articulate the rights and responsibilities of various actors, including 
the rules by which they interact. In other words, governance encompasses 
”the framework in which an institution pursues its goals, objectives, and 
policies in a coherent and coordinated manner to answer questions.” Who is in 
charge, and what are the sources of legitimacy for executive decision making 
by different actors? (2008: 12) 
A similar understanding of governance has also been used in a number of 
international comparatives studies of higher education governance (Bran and 
Merrin 1999; Clark 1983; Currie, et al. 2003; de Boer, et al. 2006; Eurydice, 2008; 
Goedegebuure, et al. 1994; Kehm & Lanzendorf 2006; Kogan & Hanney 2000; 
Kohler & Huber 2006; Leisyte 2007; OECD 2008). In other words, for the purpose 
of this study, we will be even more specific in defining university governance as 
both an organizational power structure and also a decision-making process within 
the university. We recognized that a university is a complex organization; therefore, 
it is necessary to examine the different levels of a university. In principle, our study 
is concerned mainly with regulations imposed by the public authorities in the area 
of university governance, but it will also contain some information concerning 
university management that is defined as “implementation of a set of objectives 
pursued by higher education institution on the basis of established rules” (ibidem). 
Links between university governance and management are close and strong and 
simply cannot be ignored in this study. Therefore, the study will also draw from 
analyses conducted on how university governance reforms are translated into 
managerial practices in individual countries or even in individual universities. 
The objectives, research questions, and design of the study
Some in-depth analyses on the entrepreneurial model of university governance 
have focused in particular on issues of autonomy (e.g., Thorens 1998), collegiality 
(e.g., Henkel 1997), accountability (e.g., Heller 2001), and strategic management 
(e.g., Pool 2001). Having stated this, Polish research in the field of higher 
education, and particularly in regards to university governance, is only modest 
in size. The issue of governance in higher education emerged in the mid-1990s. 
Before then, scholars were focused on the idea of the university and the system of 
higher education. Having said so, it is necessary to mention that several works have 
shed light on the conflict between traditional academic values and the demands on 
the present-day university, including a study published by Elżbieta Wnuk-Lipińska 
(1996), followed by two cross-national studies on university governance models 
(Morawski 1999) and a book on the evaluative model of higher education policy 
(Maria Wójcika et al. 2002). Apart from these publications, there are a number of 
papers that are focused on particular issues concerning university governance, 
such as autonomy (Białecki 2000), accountability (Jabłecka 2002), and the 
entrepreneurial university (Jóźwiak 2003). More recently, Jerzy Thieme (2009) 
published a very critical work on the higher education system in Poland, paying 
attention to the university governance model, which he found inadequate to meet 
social and economic needs. Marek Kwiek published a number of papers and books 
about university issues between 2005 and 2010. His work is primarily focused on 
the processes of deinstitutionalization of traditional academic norms, habits, and 
behaviors in the public sector that are closely linked to the spectacular growth of 
private higher education. Kwiek (2012:14) found that 
Traditional academic norms which sanctioned the crucial role of research 
activities in prestigious universities were temporarily suspended: academics 
relived from ‘taken-for-granted’ duties eagerly focused on large-scale, profit-
driven teaching. The suspension period, referred to as the institutionalisation 
period, lasted until the 2010-11 wave of reforms which may be interpreted as 
a government-inspired (rather than driven by academics) legal call to return 
to a traditional academic normative consensus about what public universities 
should be doing and why. 
He has made an important contribution to the discussion of the university and its 
modern challenges, presenting an overview of the overall transnational changes in 
universities in a broad social and economic context. 
Despite these useful attempts, we find some deficits in the existing debate 
on university governance in Poland, in particular, their weak impact on public 
policy. This illustrates the more general problem of soft and weak links between 
research into higher education and higher education policy. Maybe this is 
because the research is very fragmented and lacks empirical foundation, but 
there have been some solid research studies published in English. The absence 
of solid research input into the debate on governance creates room for other 
sorts of arguments that are emotional, nostalgic, partisan, or ideologically 
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driven. There is a general deficit of empirical studies on university governance 
that could contribute to the existing public discourse on universities in Poland. 
In addition, the national system of higher education in Poland and its particular 
academic traditions are believed (by many) to be unique and exceptional; 
therefore, any studies about other countries are felt to have little significance. 
It translates directly into the assumption that any political attempts to transfer 
institutional settings from other countries should be dismissed as methodologically 
inappropriate because as it is often explained by the popular phrase, “It would never 
work here.” Hence, transition countries like Poland need to have solid evidence-
based public policies in order to evaluate the possible outcomes of reforms. 
Policy implementation as such is becoming increasingly complex and a sometimes 
hostile activity. If the stakes are high — and in university governance reforms this 
is the case — no important changes can be implemented without a hard political 
struggle (de Boer, Enders, & Westerheijden 2007: 97). Without analysis based on 
solid evidence, the debate about reforms and the implementation process can easily 
be turned into a heated political debate that leads to nowhere. Many examples 
of such policy misguidance are provided in recent debates about the reforms of 
science and higher education. 
1.2. Selection of reference countries 
To address this deficit, we propose an analysis of university governance reforms in 
three selected countries that will provide some guidelines for public policy in higher 
education in Poland. The three selected countries will serve as reference points for 
university governance reforms. The selection of case studies was made on the basis 
of an existing literature review and the academic and professional experience of 
both authors. The idea was to select three countries that are extremely interesting 
from a purely academic point of view but that also hold some relevance for Polish 
public policy. In selecting the benchmark countries, we were interested in: 
(1)  European countries of very different academic traditions;
(2)  a central (national) higher education policy;
(3) recent fundamental reforms of university governance;
(4)  relevance for Polish public policy.
It is highly fashionable to look up to oversees countries (including the UK, the 
US, Australia, and Korea) as benchmarks for Polish universities. Indeed, some 
universities in these countries are leading global academic institutions, but they are 
operating in different cultural and academic contexts. In other words, an analysis 
of these countries might be interesting but would demonstrate little relevance to 
Polish higher education. If the research aims to influence higher education policy in 
Poland and more importantly to serve as a point of reference in the implementation 
process, it needs to draw models of public policy, institutional settings, and also 
good practices from countries that are located on the same academic planet.
The objectives, research questions, and design of the study
After a long discussion about the composition of the reference sample, we selected 
three countries in no particular order: the Netherlands, Portugal, and Austria. 
The Netherlands was picked as a country with the most entrepreneurial 
university governance model and the most market-based type of higher education 
public policy of the countries situated in Continental Europe. For many researchers 
in the field, the Netherlands is considered to be a leader in modernizing higher 
education policy in Continental Europe. The country applies the Anglo-Saxon 
spirit of academic entrepreneurialism in its universities, following Napoleonic 
tradition. For the sake of the analysis, it is important to note that the Netherlands 
has centrally organized higher education with a long academic tradition and 
autonomous well-established universities. 
Portugal was selected for political reasons, because until 1974, it remained under 
the authoritarian regime of Antonio Salazar; after the fall of the regime, a radical 
wave of democratization stormed the country, also involving universities. Since 
then, the democratic model of governance has become an integral part of 
Portuguese higher education. Moreover, in the new post-regime political context, 
universities became important political actors that often aired their views on 
various issues concerning the economy and society. 
The third selected country is Austria. The reason behind the choice was simple. 
Austrian universities were founded on the Humboldtian model and held many 
of its key characteristics until the late 1990s. So to speak, Austrian universities 
(particularly, the biggest schools in the country) were the most Humboldtian in all of 
Europe. Hence, for decades Austrian universities were known as the last remaining 
examples of “corporative universities” (Pechar 2005a), and to a large extent, higher 
education in Austria was ruled by the academic oligarchy (Clark 1983).
1.3. Methodology 
The analysis of benchmark countries will be primarily based on desk research. It will 
kick off with exploring the political, economic, and social circumstances under which 
the process of reforming university governance was conducted. Overall, the aim 
is to provide a broad political context that has inspired and influenced the reforms 
in higher education with occasional references to national academic traditions. 
Attention to the political dynamics of reforms is needed since the rebalancing 
of power within and over universities is an integral part of reshuffling Europe’s 
political and economic institutional order (Olsen 2007). Despite the fact that the 
contemporary discourse is dominated by an instrumental view of the university, we 
take the reverse point of view shared with Peter Maassen and Johan Olsen, that the 
university as is an institution with: 
a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in 
structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face 
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of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to idiosyncratic preferences 
and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances. 
(Maassen & Olsen 2007: 27)
It requires a great understating of the external context in which universities 
are changing as well as the internal dynamics of the university’s fabric, and an 
understanding that their past sheds light on their future. A solid analysis of 
university governance must also take into account the historical legacy of academic 
institutions. Furthermore, the study should focus on the content of the reforms, 
examining what and how they have changed. At the center of the analysis, the 
most recent initiatives of governance reforms that have led to the entrepreneurial 
model of university governance are examined, although the study also covers 
earlier attempts that began as early as the 1960s. We see the changes of university 
governance as a long and complex political process that involves both external 
and internal stakeholders. We will define external stakeholders as persons who 
have a vested interest in the function, practices, and outcomes of higher education 
and internal stakeholders as institutional governance bodies and individuals 
employed or enrolled at a higher education institution (Eurydice 2008: 12). 
Similar definitions of stakeholders have been applied in a number of studies that 
have been conducted in recent years (e.g., Maassen 2000). Having noted that, 
the report will see the process of changing university governance as an ongoing 
political struggle on various levels of governance, which leads to reshuffling the 
composition of power balance between various stakeholders. By doing so, we hope 
to increase the applicability and relevance of the study for addressing major policy 
challenges in Polish higher education. The different interests of a wide range of 
university stakeholders pose a major policy challenge that needs to be faced head 
on. Finally, we are fully aware of the limits of transferability of institutional models 
of university governance. Based on literature review and also our professional 
experience, and notwithstanding our initial ambitions to influence Polish public 
policy, we certainly do not want to use a “one size fits all” policy transfer. Numerous 
examples show that a simple copy-and-paste strategy does not work in higher 
education. On the other hand, the internationalization of higher education 
(Enders 2001; Enders & Fulton 2002) leaves no doubts that universities should no 
longer be seen as isolated entities confined with their national boundaries. In other 
words, so-called “Polish Exceptionalism” can no longer serve as an excuse, in the 
contemporary world, for rejecting any form of modernization of higher education. 
As elaborated on above, policy transfer is a complex issue, and therefore we want to 
test the outcomes of the analysis of the three benchmark countries by contrasting 
it to the experience and knowledge of Polish university leaders and policy makers. 
Therefore, the study includes 10 semi-structured Individual Depth Interviews, 
which were conducted between May 15 and June 20, 2012. The interviewees 
were carefully selected in order to cover a broad spectrum of different political 
views on university experiences from a wide range of various university managerial 
positions, including present and previous rectors, vice-rectors, bursars, and policy 
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makers. It is important to acknowledge that the experts who are interviewed are 
very experienced university managers (rectors) who have spent more than a decade 
in different positions. They are all well-established individuals with extensive 
experience in university management. The list of interviewees is attached in the 
appendix. At this point, it is important to underscore that we treat our interviewees 
as experts only in university governance and management in Poland. Therefore, 
the interviews directly refer to their professional experience on an institutional or 
system level. Due to the fact that university governance is an extremely politically 
sensitive issue in Poland, we decided (after receiving inputs from several experts) to 
cite our experts anonymously (although all interviews have been recorded). It will 
have no impact on the quality of the study but will help us to avoid being bogged 
down in domestic politics. The experts provide insight into higher education in 
Poland. They are meant to address two major issues:
(1)  which aspects of university governance require fundamental changes in Polish 
universities;
(2)  to what extent the reforms deployed in the Netherlands, Austria, and Portugal 
can (or cannot) serve as benchmarks for governance reforms in Polish 
universities.
The experts’ interviews provide an added value to the overall study and in particular 
to a feasibility study of governance reform in Poland. 
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2. Reforms in the Netherlands
The Netherlands has 16 million inhabitants and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita 50.793 USD. According to OCED (2015:231) public and private spending 
on tertiary education is estimated around 1.8% GDP. Overall, Dutch universities 
are ranked high in transnational university rankings. However, there is none of 
among top 20, but one might even six of them among top-100 universities. The 
Netherlands aspires to be one of the leading countries in research and higher 
education. Traditionally, the state has played an important role in Dutch higher 
education, although its role has been changing over time. The Dutch society is 
characterized by a strong belief in the potential of national government to design 
and steer society, including higher education (de Boer, Enders, & Leisyte 2006: 
65). In major global university rankings, Dutch universities are ranked respectably. 
Higher education in the Netherlands is comprised of two sectors: the university 
sector (which lies at the center of this study) and the hogescholen sector. There 
are 13 universities in the Netherlands, and they have been separate legal entities 
since the 1960s. The 54 higher education institutions known as hogescholens 
are focused on the application and transfer of knowledge with respect to specific 
professions; they perform completely different tasks and therefore have developed 
a different governance structure. The estimated number of hogescholen students is 
approximately 420,000. In universities the number is 242,000 in the year 2011. 
In order to understand the current governance system of Dutch universities, one 
must take an intellectual journey into the modern history of Dutch higher education 
because the current state of the art is a mixture of:
(a)  modern trends in public management;
(b)  developments in surrounding countries (since Dutch higher education has 
been always under influence of German, English, and French views of higher 
education);
(c)  a solid package of experience from the past that has carved some sort of path 
dependency that claim developments of great importance often occur early 
in the long causal chain that leads to that outcome, perhaps even in the very 
distant past.
So, to evaluate the existing model of university governance, one must take into 
account the entire process of the building governance constellation. The modern 
history of the Dutch university mirrors political trends in public policy in the 
Netherlands in the post-war period. To make a long story short, there are three 
fundamental governmental initiatives that mark turning points in the process of 
reforming university governance structure. The first reform, called WUB, was 
implemented in 1972, and the second was a policy document known as HOAK, 
which was published in 1985. The last initiative, called the MUB, was put into life 
in 1997. It is hard to overestimate the impact of these initiatives in the process of 
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building the existing model of university governance in the Netherlands. 
2.1. Napoleonic tradition 
Until 1970, Dutch university governance was comprised of two pillars academic 
governance, which was in the hands of university senates; boards of curators, 
who were responsible for administrative tasks and encouraging scientific teaching 
and research. De Boer (2003) refer to this university governance structure as 
the coexistence of two governing models. The primarily academic activities 
were governed in a collegial way. The secondary activities of internal support for 
academic affairs and the administration of finance were governed in a bureaucratic 
way. This “duplex ordo,” based on the coexistence of extremely different forms 
of governance (collegial-hierarchical), must have created some potential fields 
of misunderstanding and even conflicting situations. And indeed, these parallel 
power structures were major sources of tension at universities. The concept 
of the university senate was established in 1815 at the end of the Napoleonic 
period as a collective body that aimed to organize all academic matters at the 
university. In other words, the university senate was a form of self-governing body 
with respect to academic matters. The senate was comprised of democratically 
elected representatives from the academic community and was chaired by a rector 
(Arriens 1970). Senators were required to be full professors. The role of the senate 
and its status was reasonably stable and well-defined, unlike the position of the 
board of curators, which had been rather ambiguous and unstable.
It must be said that the Dutch university governance system has some unique 
history in regard to supervisory boards. In 1813, the Dutch developed a national 
higher education law in which public universities were part of the bureaucracy. 
So, it should not be a surprise that university internal governance was formally 
regulated by the state (Donner 1978). The role of the board of curators had 
been changing considerably over time. Early in this period, the members were 
representatives of the university at the ministry, but over time, the role changed 
and they begun to represent the ministry at universities (Jensma & De Vries 1997: 
81). In addition, their tasks evolved from policy making into dealing with more 
internal organizational issues. One study described this ambiguity in the following 
way:
 
It arose from the board’s being the most important university governance 
body and the guardian of the university interests, while on the other side 
it was also an arm of the ministry through its tasks of advise and control. 
(de Boer et al. 1991)
Despite all the ambiguity, the members of the board of curators were appointed 
by the Ministry of Education. And despite strong criticism, the boards of curators 
remained an important part of Dutch universities governance structure until 1971. 
On top of it, the Ministry of Education appointed a “civil secretary,” a position that 
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was attached to each university to support the boards of curators.1 Initially, their 
role was very marginal, but beginning with the passage of the first national higher 
education law in 1876 (which caused a growing amount of red tape), the role of 
the so-called “civil secretaries” became more important over time. And as Jensma 
& De Vries (1997: 104) claim, the civil secretaries in fact performed as university 
co-governors after 1945. Initially, the state’s authority was exercised by a board of 
curators, whose members were formally appointed and dismissed by the Crown. 
The unsalaried curators had many tasks: ensuring the university’s compliance 
with various laws: teaching quality, university buildings, and property. In the 19th 
century, the board of curators had a strong local and regional character. Harry de 
Boer (2011) states that an honorable and prestigious job on the side was filled by 
gentlemen of a certain standing and age. Many of them were university alumni 
and had an academic background in law, with networks in the capital. Curators 
were appointed for life. The board’s role was very complex, bearing in mind the 
dual nature of its mandate. The result of its ambivalent position as “an outpost 
of the government” was that curators did “too much harm and too little good” 
(Huizinga 1951: 22). 
After WWII, the government made several serious attempts to address the issue of 
supervisory boards in Dutch higher education. Initially, the Reinik Committee and 
later the Van der Pot Committee (1949) made several propositions to modernize 
the boards of curators, but it made little impact on the law of higher education in 
1960, which introduced cosmetic changes to the role of the board of curators. 
It remained responsible for the university’s nonacademic affairs and continued to be 
accountable to the minister. The board consisted of five to seven persons appointed 
by the Crown for a four-year term, with the rector or one or more members of the 
senate attending the meetings of the board. The president-curator was the legal 
representative of the university. A number of reforms of the internal university 
governance attempted to increase the effectiveness of the decision-making process 
and the professionalism of university management. But all of them were blocked 
or stopped, because they were seen as too intrusive and clearly heading into the 
direction of New Public Management (as this was known later). They were attacked 
by all major stakeholders for various, often contradictory reasons. They were too 
adventurous for the 1960s and did not fit the societal, political, and economic 
climate of the times — the reforms were ahead of their time. The boards of curators 
were finally abolished in 1970 and were replaced by university councils. 
The council was the university’s supreme decision-making body, composed of 
a maximum of 40 members, with a mixture of academics, non-academics, students, 
and external representation. Its decisions were implemented by a second top-level 
decision-making body, the executive board, which included three to five persons, 
one of which was the rector.
1 Such a position still exists in Belgium (in Flanders).
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2.2. Democratization of the university 
The Dutch government has traditionally played an important role in the 
coordination of the higher education system, but since the 1960s, the 
government’s interference with well-nigh endless regulations came to be seriously 
questioned. The first attempt to rethink the concepts of university governance was 
through the so-called Maris Committee in 1967, which came up with a proposition 
to centralize the structure of university governance. This model was rejected, 
but it sparked a serious discussion about university organization and the idea of 
engaging new internal stakeholders (junior academics) in the process of forming 
a new model of university governance. It involved two extremely different types 
of thinking about university governance; the first involved a professional type of 
university management. The second type involved a democratic way of running 
a university. The clash between the two approaches was related to the increasingly 
diverse opinions expressed by Dutch society, which had a number of contradictory 
expectations from higher education. An intense public and academic discourse 
about the future model of university governance produced several proposed 
reforms of university models. According to de Boer (1999), the most quoted 
classification comes from Lammers (1969), who listed three major models: 
(a) a hierarchical model, (b) a professional model, and (c) a cooperation model. One 
must bear in mind that the boundaries between these three models were clear 
and rigid. The hierarchical model was based on “duplex ordo,” with the location 
of administrative and decision-making powers at the central level. But it conceived 
of students as merely “clients,” and the general public was considered as the 
employer of graduates. It kept the position of the board of curators and left the 
administrators’ role fairly untouched. In the professional model (supported by 
younger and progressive academic staff), authority was based on the expertise 
of professionally trained people. It was conceived as an organization in which the 
scientific corps would be responsible for teaching and research, and managerial 
and administrative power would be held by professionals. As de Boer (1999) 
suggested, the professional model assigned some decisive power to students as 
prime beneficiaries of the university, either through direct or indirect democracy. 
Regardless of these changes, it kept the position of the boards of curators, or 
more generally, the administrators, fairly untouched. The cooperation model 
was conceived as an organization in which all the members of the academic 
community bear responsibility for the university are a part of the power structure 
by playing active roles in running the university. A distinguished characteristic of 
the cooperation model concerns the positions of students, who were considered as 
full members of the academic community. Ironically, students called the cooperative 
model a “soviet-style” university, although it shared no common features with 
the real universities in the Soviet Union. This model was rightly identified by 
Blau & Scott (1962) as a “mutual benefit association,” which was accountable 
as a whole university community (not curators or the scientific corps) to society. 
The foundation of the cooperation model was the abolition of boards of curators, 
which were perceived as the hands of repressive state authority.
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The Dutch students launched their campaign for the democratization of the 
university, which they called a “Democratic Manifesto,” which aimed to end the 
isolation of traditional students’ associations and also to focus on the social and 
economic situation of students. Initially, the protests had an economic background 
— as described in the “Syndicate Manifesto” published by the student unions — but 
the protests gradually oriented toward a more political agenda, which also involved 
the democratization of the university. As de Boer (1999) underlined, students 
tended to dress their manifesto in a broader political agenda in order to attract 
a bigger number of students. Therefore, the student movement of the 1960s 
was a part of a more fundamental social movement, which fought the repressive 
authority of the state and for a more participatory state and bigger room for 
civil society. At the same time, it reflected a wider social and political mood for 
democratization and liberalization of post-war society, as the post-war social order 
had lost its ground. Historically, the university governance model marginalized 
students in the institutional power structure and dismissed their say in the decision-
making process. Therefore, their criticism was primarily directed toward the model 
of university governance. Students argued that the existing model of university 
governance had to be democratized and take students on board in the process of 
running universities. There is some ambiguity as to the role of students in sparking 
changes in university governance in the Netherlands. But a fair judgment is made 
by Harry de Boer (1999), who claimed that “student action provided an important 
breeding ground for thoughts on a new university governance structure. But it would 
give the student movement too much credit to claim that the reorganization of the 
university was due only to their action.”
2.3. The University Governance Reorganization Act 1971 - 
WUB 
Undoubtedly, the year 1971 marked a major turning point in the modern history of 
Dutch higher education with regard to university governance. The higher education 
law, called the WUB (Wet Universitaire Bestuurshervorming) - also known as The 
1969 Structure of University Governance Act because it was accepted only in 
1971 - came as a surprise to everyone. The content of the reforms could have 
been anticipated by observing the spirit of the times, whereby circumstances 
under which it was implemented were at least intriguing. The minister Jan Veringa 
initially sent questionnaires to all academic institutions about the university 
governance model but launched his memorandum before the filled questionnaires 
even arrived back to the ministry. The timing of his memorandum was slightly 
unfortunate, but apparently he tried to suppress the turmoil with the universities. 
The minister admits in one of many interviews that “there were so many differences 
of opinion within the university, that a ‘workable‘ result of the questionnaire 
could not be expected” (Koolwijk 1984: 54). Harry de Boer (1999) claims that 
it is a misconception to see the roots of WUB in the student revolt in France and 
Germany in late 1960s. “In the political circles there was much discontent with 
the governance structure of the universities and with it a growing awareness that 
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the government should interfere.” The WUB tried to marry two conflicting views 
of university governance (Loen 1972). On one hand, the law saw the university as 
a functional organization set to deliver certain goals to which everyone must be 
committed. On the other hand, it established a form of cooperation between the 
different parties (academic, nonacademic staff, and students) in achieving common 
goals. The political and social turmoil in regards to university governance resulted 
in an unexpected situation: suddenly, the government became an independent 
and strong political actor in higher education policy. Before this, the academic 
community dismissed any form of governmental interference into the university 
except for codifying what had been decided by universities. As de Boer (1999: 319) 
notes, until “that time no law had ever passed without the explicit agreement from 
the universities themselves. This changed drastically. Government intervention since 
then has become the norm.” The Structure of University Governance Act (WUB) 
passed the Parliament and created the system of functional representation in 
which all constituencies of the university community had the right to elect 
representatives in university and faculty councils, and the right to be elected. 
The councils were made the centers of power in a system of representative 
leadership. The WUB established a new governance structure of universities that 
comprised of three layers of decision making: (1) the central level, (2) the faculty 
level, and (3) the unit level. The central level was composed of the university 
council, executive board, and board of deans. The university council consisted 
of 40 members at most, of whom five-sixths were drawn from the university 
community; a minimum of one-third were academics, a maximum of one-third were 
nonacademic staff, and a maximum of one-third were students. The number of 
council members was extended to include external lay members, who represented 
a minimum of one-fifth of the membership. All council members, lay persons 
excluded, were democratically elected by the university community. All university 
faculties were required to be equally represented). Members served for at least 
a two-year period, with the exception of students, who served only one year. The 
meetings of the university council were public. The chair of the university council 
was appointed by the members but did not have to be a university council member. 
Members of the executive board could participate in the meetings of the university 
council, though only with an advisory vote. The university council had final say 
with respect to (a) budgets, (b) institutional plans, (c) annual reports, (d) general 
academic procedures, and (e) rules and regulations. Some responsibilities could 
be delegated to subcommittees. The executive board was the highest authority in 
the university and was responsible for managerial matters, including finance and 
personnel, but managerial authorities could not be delegated or attributed, only 
mandated. The board of deans was composed of faculty deans and was chaired by 
the rector magnificus. The board of deans had mainly advisory powers relating to 
research and teaching. Apart from its role in nominating the rector magnificus, its 
chief function was the granting of doctoral degrees. In short: the executive board 
and the university council ran the university together.
On the faculty level, governance structure was composed of the faculty board, 
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faculty council, the dean, and three standing committees (research committee, 
education committee, and exam committee). The faculty board was the executive 
body at the faculty level and consisted of a maximum five persons, who were 
chosen by the faculty council. The dean held the chair and he or she must be 
a faculty professor (in most cases, the dean was in office for two to three years). 
The roles of the faculty council and the faculty board and the relation between them 
were similar to their mirror bodies at the central level, though decisions at this level 
concerned faculty matters. The faculty board was accountable to the faculty council 
and the university-wide executive board, which had the right to advise. The board 
was obliged to inform the council, but the council could NOT dismiss the board. The 
faculty council (the size was determined by the university) had the authority to 
govern the faculty, except for those responsibilities that were in the province of the 
faculty board. The duty of the faculty council was:
(a) approval of the faculty budget;
(b) determination of faculty ordinances; 
(c) coordination of teaching and research programs (the council had to approve 
teaching and research programs that were established by “Disciplinary 
Research Groups”);
(d) delegation of some responsibilities to the faculty board; 
(e) oversight of faculty boards. 
There were also three standing committees, two of which were particularly 
important elements of governance structure that address the needs of society. 
Members of the education and research committee were appointed by the faculty 
council and at least half of them were required to be academics; they had advisory 
powers with respect to faculty, teaching, and research programs. The examination 
committee had a purely internal character. 
On the unit level, the disciplinary research group (DRG) was an important 
governing body, which was responsible for the design of study and research 
programs. DRGs were small clusters of professor and their assistants working in 
the same disciplinary area. In a DRG, the majority was enjoyed by academics (since 
students and non-academics were not included) and it was chaired by one of the 
professors. The procedural rules of the DRGs were set by faculty councils and 
faculty boards. DRG proposals had to be approved by a faculty council.
Last, but not least important, administrative units existed at both the central and 
faculty levels. Administrative units at the central level were in the realm of the 
secretary of the university, and administrative units at the faculty level were in the 
realm of the chief executive officer, but the executive board could decide to give 
priority to the dean. 
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2.4. HOAK 1985 – “steering from a distance” 
Until the end of the 1970s, the coordination of Dutch higher education and 
research was a mixture of state regulation and academic self-governance. The 
system was generally a closed pedagogische provinz (Boin et al. 2002). But in the 
late 1970s, the effectiveness of a heavy involvement of the state and a number of 
implemented external regulations on universities was seriously questioned. There 
was a general disbelief that state regulation imposed “from the top” could produce 
expected outcomes. 
It was felt that that the higher education sector had become too estranged 
from the rest of society, it should give up ‘ivory tower’ position and parochial 
status. The entire public sector, including the universities, was too much 
inward looking (“navel gazing”). (De Boer et al. 2006: 68)
In 1985, the Dutch Ministry of Education and Science published a policy document 
that proposed revolutionary changes and terminated traditional long-standing 
relations based on planning and control between the government and higher 
education institutions. This strategic document implied fundamental changes in the 
relation between the government and universities. It introduced a famous concept 
of “steering from a distance,” which was “aimed to be replaced by a philosophy in 
which the government’s role is confined more to setting boundary conditions within 
which the higher education system is to operate, leaving more room to maneuver 
at the institutional level” (Goedegebuure et al., 1993). HOAK (“Hoger Onderwijs: 
Autonomie en Kwaliteit”; “Higher Education: Autonomy and Quality”) was only 
a policy document, but it had a tremendous impact on the spirit of laws that were 
inspired by HOAK for more than two decades. The document was a major step 
toward greater institutional autonomy and self-responsibility of universities since 
it anticipated that they needed more freedom to shape their own activities (Vught 
1997: 212). “Managerial self-governance” was slowly knocking on the door of 
the ivory tower. The HAOK policy document challenged it and intended to grant 
universities large autonomy. This was a revolutionary change in comparison to 
traditional rules and regulations that had saddled Dutch universities with a great 
number of detailed regulations, policy papers, and recommendations. It was partly 
the heritage of traditional, post-Napoleonic Continental bureaucracy and partly 
the integral feature of the welfare state that developed in the Western European 
countries after WWII. Universities themselves were regarded as public sector 
organizations that were very inflexible and inward oriented. Their governance 
structure was a combination of a faculty guild and state bureaucracy (Clark 1983), 
with academic self-governance for academic matters and state regulation for 
nonacademic matters. This system is also known as a “bureau-professionalism” 
mode of coordination (Clark and Newman 1997). The reforms of the 1980s were 
driven by austerity plans and cuts in public spending that also covered higher 
education. The 1985 reforms were introduced under the bigger political umbrella of 
“steering at a distance,” which set the boundary condition under which universities 
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perform. Universities were given more autonomy but became more accountable 
to the state, which changed its instruments to steer them. Indirect influence was 
more effective in delivering public goals, which had gradually become more quality 
related than quantity oriented. This new approach to Dutch universities is widely 
known as “HOAK”. 
The move from directive political influence toward “steering from a distance” did 
not imply a lesser role for the national government. Undoubtedly, it did not imply 
“rolling back of the frontier of the state.” But it subtly changed the instruments of 
public policy in a more indirect and effective way. First, the Dutch Constitution put 
the ultimate responsibility for higher education on the government. Second, the 
government was in a position to determine the direction (in research and teaching) 
through research evaluation or accreditation of teaching programs (de Boer et al. 
2006: 72). 
2.5. The Modernising University Act (MUB) of 1997
The HOAK document presented a new vision of the relation between the 
government and higher education, which had far-reaching consequences on the 
structure of university governance. The policy outlined in HOAK implies rethinking 
the existing university power structure. In the new vision of universities, the 
autonomy of academic institutions should have been expanded (at the expense of 
a number of external university regulations) in order to provide them more leeway 
to respond effectively to a rapidly changing environment. Individual universities 
were expected to take more responsibility for their performance in research, 
education, and also in other activities. The reforms of university governance were 
sparked by the growing assumption of “government failure” and the significant 
underperformance of public sector organizations. Harry de Boer (2006; and 
Pierre & and Peters 2000) identified five specific reasons that led to major shifts in 
thinking of governance in the public realm. The first was the economic recession, 
a major driver of the reforms in higher education (de Vijlder 1996). Secondly, 
internationalization, globalization and Europeanization of higher education 
influenced the reforms. Higher education had gradually become a subject of 
supranational regulations, and “the game without frontiers” required taking a new 
approach. Another major reason was related to dissatisfaction with the welfare 
state performance, disillusion with the state as service provider, and a distrust of 
etatism. It was closely linked to the fourth reason — an ideological u-turn toward 
the free market, which was sparked and heavily influenced by the public choice 
theories. In higher education, it meant a gradual move toward a “demand driven” 
market in which the state set and acted as arbiter for the rules of competitions and 
is “buying” services from the higher education providers. In this realm, universities 
became (public) entrepreneurs, and students became customers. Last, but not 
the least, New Public Management (Pollitt 1993) was a liberal trend in public 
policy that introduced market rules in the public realm. Public sector organizations 
were expected to operate as entrepreneurial organizations, focusing on the 3Es 
Reforms in the Netherlands
(economics, effectiveness, and efficiency). 
The university as a representative democracy (introduced in 1972) survived until 
1997, when the concept of New Public Management became dominant in the 
Dutch public sector. In other words, Dutch universities entered a new era that 
substantially modernized the structure of internal governance (de Boer 2003; de 
Boer & Stensaker 2007). The modernization of university governance structure 
aimed to address the major governance deficits that had negatively affected the 
development of Dutch universities in the 1990s. These deficits were as follows: 
(a) lack of transparency, (b) dispersal of authority, (c) co-determination in decision 
making, and (d) inadequacy and incoherence of internal communication. On the 
other hand, the reforms of 1997 took place under the much broader fashionable 
umbrella of New Public Management, which led to major changes in universities 
and transformed them into “managed professional public organizations.” In 1997, 
the concept of “university as representative democracy” was replaced by a model 
of university governance in which “executive leadership was strengthened: powers 
were concentrated, democratically chosen councils lost significant powers, and 
strong and conservative decision-making bodies such as the “vakgroep” (the 
Disciplinary research group, DRG) were abolished” (de Boer 2006: 31). Harry de 
Boer described the process of redefining university governance and moving from 
horizontally spread authority toward vertically spread authority as a process of 
“toppling of the Dutch university.” A starting point of the reforms was growing 
criticism of higher education institutions for their inward orientation, lack of 
leadership, fragmented power structure, unduly long and cumbersome decision-
making process, and weak response to rapidly changing social and economic 
contexts. This criticism came from both inside and outside of academia. In 
addition, the central government was dissatisfied with limited cooperation between 
universities and business. Therefore, it aimed to replace the university governance 
model of representative democracy with a business-like organization. The 
government formed the steering group, “Studyability and Quality,” to address major 
problems in university governance. The group was composed of representatives 
of the major stakeholders of higher education (universities and hogescholen) and 
students. The steering group identified shortcomings or drawbacks in regard to 
university governance (de Boer 2006: 34), including a lack of clear responsibilities, 
since most of the important decisions at various university levels were made by 
collective bodies, which had opened the opportunity for various degrees of shirking. 
In addition, universities lacked transparency in the decision-making structure and 
process, which together with the dual structure (board and councils), disabled or 
delayed the decision-making process. Lastly, universities faced some difficulties 
to act as a unified organization due to lack of communication between the various 
organizational levels. Specifically, universities had well-developed horizontal 
relations between the various collective bodies, but the relationship between the 
executive boards and the faculty deans had been neglected. 
The analysis of the situation at universities was reflected in the HOAK strategic 
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document. HOAK was followed by various governmental initiatives that aimed 
to “steer from a distance,” but they did not modernize the structure of the 
governance of universities. But it was hardly denied that one of the main reasons 
for underachievement was the governance structure. The concept of the university 
as a “representative democracy” became slightly outdated and inadequate 
for modern challenges that required a more managerial approach. In order to 
address these issues, the government prepared the initiative called “Act on the 
Modernization of the University Governing Organizations” (Dutch abbreviation 
MUB Wet Modernisering Universitaire Bestuursorganisatie). Based on an early 
assessment, it wanted to change the university governance in the following 
directions:  
(1) concentration of powers in “preferably single-headed positions,”;
(2) more transparency in authority relations;
(3) improvement in the decisiveness and effectiveness of decision making;
(4) enhancement of institutional autonomy;
(5) participation of students and staff in the decision-making process. 
First and foremost, individual universities received a range of responsibilities 
from the national government. It was a result of a new philosophy in public policy 
known as “steering from a distance” and a devolution of power and responsibilities 
downwards. In particular, it applied to funding, quality assurance, personnel policies, 
and the like and was prescribed to executive positions and managers. It all built 
a foundation for universities as “public entrepreneurs” in that they were largely 
held responsible for functioning and achieving their goals. Until 1995, the minister 
for Education, Science, and Culture appointed the executive board and therewith 
could influence the mission. With the introduction of the new law on management 
of universities (MUB), the executive board was appointed by the supervisory 
board, which was meant to supervise the executive board. The members of the 
supervisory board were appointed by the minister.
Until the MUB, the students had more power within the so-called faculty councils 
in which they were “co-managing” the institution. The MUB abolished the 
co-management and replaced it with “participation in the institutions 
management of staff and students within the so-called university councils.” 
The former law on higher education gave the Ministry for Education, Science, 
and Culture power to influence the internal structure of universities. With the 
introduction of the MUB, the number of regulations was reduced, and more 
freedom was granted to the executive board, which received the upper hand. The 
representative joint decision-making bodies became representative advisory 
bodies of staff and students. But most powers were taken from them, in 
particular those in respect to setting the budget. As a result, these decision-
making bodies became slightly more powerful than just ordinary advisory boards, 
but they still had very limited power. In the Dutch context, a major shift concerned 
abolishing “disciplinary teaching and research units” (vakgroepen, DRGs), which 
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were generally seen as centers of conservatism that opposed any changes in higher 
education. Last, but probably the most important change in regards to governance 
structure, was the introduction of a system of appointing executives. This may also 
be called the “toppling.” All university leaders were being appointed instead of 
being elected. It began with the supervisory board that appointed the members of 
the central executive board. The central executive boards appointed the deans, who 
appointed the program directors. 
2.6. The university governance structure under the MUB
The “democratic dimension” of the university is limited to councils on the faculty 
and central level in which both staff and students have their representatives. The 
structure of governance after MUB is comprised of the main following bodies: 
Table 1. Main Bodies of the university structure since MUB 1997 
Supervisory Board
Executive Board <--------- University Council (advisory role)
Deans/Faculty Board <----------------------- Faculty Councils (advisory role) 
Scientific Director + Educational Director 
Departments and Chairs
The supervisory board (five members) is appointed by the minister and its 
responsibility covers the following tasks: supervising the executive board; approving 
university strategic plans, budgeting and long-term financial planning; approving 
annual accounts and the annual report; and approving executive regulations and 
the decision-making structure. In addition, it is expected to advise the executive 
board but not provide detailed instruction as to the university functioning because 
this is the responsibility of the executive board, which runs the university and is 
only overseen by the supervisory board. Lastly, the supervisory board appoints 
three members of the executive board. The executive board is appointed by the 
supervisory board and takes full responsibility for the university. The executive 
board is finally responsible for the allocation of resources within the university, in 
cooperation with the university council. The executive board determines rules for 
generating third party funds (for instance from consultancies and research projects 
for public organisations, including the European Commission). The university 
council plays an advisory role to the executive board, and half of the seats are 
designated for students and the other half are for staff (also called employees), 
which basically means that academics normally have fewer seats than the students 
do. The new university council no longer has decision-making powers; one of its 
most powerful rights (approval of the budget) has been removed. It is to a large 
extent a representative advisory body. It has the right of comment with respect to 
institutional rules and regulations and important policy documents, such as the 
strategic plan. The MUB Act offers two options with respect to the new university 
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council. The first option entails a so-called divided system of representation in which 
there are separate advisory bodies for employees (academic and nonacademic) 
and for students. The second option is a so-called undivided or combined body, 
referred to as the “university council new style,” and consists of representatives 
of both employees (50 percent) and students (50 percent). The board for doctoral 
degrees more or less replaces the former board of deans, though in most cases the 
new board is a little less powerful, and persons other than deans can be members 
(Country Report; Netherlands 2007). 
There were also deep changes on the faculty level. MUB transformed the relations 
between the deans and faculty boards. It can be a single-headed authority in the 
form of a deanship, although universities are permitted to retain a collegium as 
the executive body (i.e., a faculty board). The dean or the faculty board, however, 
has more powers than in the previous governance system. The executive board of 
the university appoints the deans, who may be drawn from inside or outside the 
university or faculty. Most universities have opted for deanships in preference 
to faculty boards. (Country Report; Netherlands 2007). Faculty Councils at the 
central level have lost most of their powers and have become advisory bodies. Again 
there is the option of a divided or a combined structure, provided that the choice 
is the same as that made at the central level. The Act prescribes that half of the 
members of the faculty council must be students. Students also participate in the 
education committee. The executive board will resolve disputes between dean and 
faculty council. The size of the faculty councils varies from three to more than 20 
members (Country Report; Netherlands 2007).
The MUB reforms were implemented between 1997 and 1998, and the 
implementation process was followed by an evaluation conducted by an ad hoc 
committee, the committee Datema. A concluding report found that the MUB reform 
of 1997 was quickly and successfully implemented, although not everyone was 
equally pleased with its content and direction of change. The least satisfied were 
those who lost the biggest amount of power within the university — members of the 
councils. Another study was conducted eight years later by de Boer, Goedegebuure, 
and Huisman (2005). They found that all university stakeholders expressed 
some criticism about various aspects of the governance system, although they 
largely do not demonstrate negative feelings about the overall outcome. A part 
of the evaluation study was a survey of a representative sample of the academic 
community (N = 1227). On average, the respondents gave “a pass mark” of 
6.38 on a scale from 1 (extremely poor) to 10 (excellent). The research provides 
a picture of both sides of the coin. Among the positive effects of the MUB 
reforms, academics listed concentration of organizational power that contributed 
to decisiveness of decision making. It was declared by executives, managers, and 
also members of the councils that the new governing constellation provided more 
room to respond to external changes. Hence, the decisiveness and effectiveness of 
university decision-making has increased. And in addition, Dutch universities have 
been rather successful in making strategic decisions and responding to external 
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demands. But the survey also showed that within the academic community, the 
most dissatisfied group was the academic staff and – to some extent – the students. 
For many, “full blown” participation and the transparency of decision making still 
remains problematic. The survey shows that for executives (managers, council 
members, etc.), the new structure is transparent, but for ordinary staff members 
who are “not involved in the power structure,” transparency is a big issue. Also, the 
new role of the supervisory board remains unclear. 
2.7. Evaluation of the Dutch reforms
Overall, The Dutch government is generally satisfied with the effects of the reforms. 
The 2005 white paper “Wetgevingsnotitie” and the Explanatory Statement of the 
2006 bill for Higher Education and Research (WHOO) confirm that the government 
continues to “steer higher education from a distance” and to see universities as 
“public entrepreneurs.” In other words, the minister wants to expand the autonomy 
of universities by reducing the amount of detailed regulations and replacing them 
with a limited number of guidelines and principles. Trust instead of distrust should 
be the point of departure (de Boer 2006: 38). Thus, the government wants to 
establish zorgplichten for universities — that is, areas of university performance in 
which goals are defined but not the means to meet them. These areas include the 
quality of teaching and research, the organization of adequate staff and student 
participation, and good governance. With respect to governance, universities 
will determine their own governance structure and practices. Beside vertical 
accountability (to the government) and horizontal accountability (to society), 
there are no other regulations expected to be implemented with respect to the 
university governance structure. De Boer (2006: 38) reports that universities will 
have no obligations to keep deans, faculty members, departments heads, and other 
employees, and only two governing bodies are required by the law (the executive 
board — to run the university — and the supervisory board — to oversee the 
executive board), and the rest will be up to universities. The supervisory board was 
also equipped with an instrument known as codes of conduct for good governance 
(de Boer & Goedegebuure 2007). The codes of conduct are rules that were initiated 
and agreed upon by the collective of the universities themselves in a voluntary 
process, but in response to pressures from the outside world.
One of the innovations was an idea to introduce or reestablish some form of 
external body at the university that could serve as a buffer body between the 
university and the ministry. It has been always a sensitive issue, since it bridges the 
university with the political (or generally external) world, providing the latter some 
power to influence the performance of higher education institutions. Harry de Boer 
and Jon File (2011:165) perfectly explain that “universities should increasingly 
be able to act as ‘public entrepreneurs.’ Supervisory boards should supervise for 
the ministry, not on her/his behalf.” Hence, the minister cannot send instructions 
and commands to supervisory boards, but they have to inform her/him about 
the functioning of their universities. The regulations in regard to supervisory 
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boards are determined in the higher education act, and further guidelines and tips 
are provided by the “code of governance for universities” (Association of Dutch 
Universities 2007). Members of supervisory boards are appointed by the Minister 
of Education, Culture, and Science for a four-year term and can be dismissed by the 
minister. The minister must consult with the university council (or if none exists, an 
equivalent body composed of major internal university stakeholders, academics, 
students and non-academics) when appointing members. De Boer and File argue 
that it is the universities that propose the candidates and the minister decides on 
a case-by-case basis. There are no specific criteria for members of the university 
supervisory board. In reality, there are several criteria that should be taken into 
account, such as gender balance, and one of the members should play a role as the 
liaison with the university council, and one should have an academic/professional 
background in finance. Members of the university supervisory boards are not 
paid a salary, but they receive an annual honorarium that is equal for all public 
universities, 11.345 euros for the chair and 9.075 euros for the other members. 
Boer and Goedegeburure (2005) identified several major concerns about 
the supervisory boards after 10 years, such as a deficit in the transparency 
of governance structure, which the supervisory boards have a role in. 
The supervisory boards communicate almost exclusively with the executive boards. 
Contacts with external organizations as are very limited. According to the study, 
they hardly ever talked to the ministry or members of Parliament. Supervisory 
boards are formally accountable to the ministry, but the accountability is 
materialized via a formal annual report that does not lead to any form of feedback 
or general communication from the ministry. There is a far-reaching lack of clarity 
as to the content of the reports, which makes the idea of accountability to the 
minister vague and confusing. No guidelines have been established in this matter. 
Furthermore, the composition of the board was aimed to represent the society as 
a whole, but in terms of age, gender, and professional background, it is the same 
old story in the form of an “old boys’ network.” Another concern is the boards’ 
independence. It is questioned in two aspects: (a) members of supervisory boards 
have indirect links to businesses that cooperate with the university (e.g., members 
sit on various external boards), and (b) a supervisory board may not be able to 
critically oversee an executive board’s decisions based on the executive board’s own 
advice. Another concern is the ambivalent accountability of supervisory board. 
How can the supervisory boards balance a wide range of often conflicting interests 
of various stakeholders? To whom are supervisors accountable? Formally, they 
are vertically accountable to the minister, but they should be also accountable to 
other stakeholders. The mechanisms through which they are accountable to other 
stakeholders are unclear. 
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2.8. Conclusions
University governance in the Netherlands has changed significantly over the 
last 15 years. It has transformed from “representative democracy” toward 
“entrepreneurial organization.” Nowadays, universities are evolving gradually into 
“more tightly coupled organizations” (de Boer, Enders, & Leisyte 2007). The new 
model of university governance, and in particular its strengthening, has created 
more managerial space to make strategic decisions and respond to external 
changes. It is assumed that it has opened a window of opportunity for a number of 
institutional alliances and also for other forms of cooperation between universities 
and other higher education institutions in the Netherlands. It is also believed that 
strong executive leadership has had a strong impact on a significant increase in total 
revenues from third parties. In 2005, one-fourth of university budgets on average 
came from contract activities, and in some universities, the amount increases to 
one-third of their budget. The impact of the new university constellation is seen in 
the implementation of innovation in educational services. Dutch universities have 
managed to respond quickly to the changing demands of education, but more 
importantly, they have used the implementation of the Bacheolor-Master structure 
to profile themselves in order to attract their clients (i.e. students). Thus, they are 
able to attract students from all over the world. Last but not least, these innovations 
in education have led to increased diversity and higher quality of education, 
which was confirmed by the Onderwijsinspectie (2003). Finally, by strengthening 
executive and managerial positions at universities, the legislation has opened 
the opportunity to establish strategic policy in research. It was necessary due to 
external national and supranational initiatives to encourage universities to build 
their research profiles by selecting their areas of “excellence” and “critical mass.” 
In addition, executive boards are steering more on the basis of performance in 
education and research, instead of steering on inputs and intentions. Largely, they 
are better informed about the outcome of research and teaching performance in 
different units. By using their power, and being equipped with sufficient information, 
they can influence the research priorities of their institutions/units. The new 
governance structure provides them with managerial instruments to build and 
improve their research capacity by rewarding best performing organizations/teams 
(e.g., with additional resources) and “motivating” or “restructuring” those who have 
clearly underperformed. It is interesting to say that the Dutch academic community 
has shown a large degree of satisfaction with the corporate-like model of university. 
Despite large concerns or even fear, the changes introduced in 1997 have increased 
decisiveness and effectiveness. To sum up the Dutch reforms of 1997: 
 
The Dutch case shows that stronger executive leadership with clear lines 
of responsibility enhances the strategic responsiveness and profiling of the 
institution in several ways. It may serve as an example of smart executive 
leadership to an entrepreneurial organization in which academics can still do 
what they do best: teaching and research. (EC 2006: 31)
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3. Portugal
Portugal has 11 million inhabitants and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
21.733 USD. According to OCED (2015:231) public and private spending on 
tertiary education is estimated around 1.4% GDP. Nome of Portuguese universities 
are ranked high in global ranking and three of them are around 300th place in 
with world. Portugal was ruled by the authoritarian regime of Antonio Salazar 
until 1974. Before it the university governance structure neither resembled the 
Napoleonian model (like in the Netherlands), nor in the Humboldtian one (like 
in Austria). It was rather a specific mixture of semi autonomous, religion-based 
institutions that developed strong ties with the state (Sobral 2012:49-67). 
This plain fact had a huge impact on the development of higher education in the 
country. In the early 1970s, the system revealed typically elitist features, with 
a student enrolment rate of around 7 percent. Higher education was reserved for 
the privileged few, which increased social inequality. Under the Salazar regime, 
higher education did not play an important role in the society, and therefore little 
attention was attached to its functioning. The only act that the national assembly 
tried to introduce was Act 5/73, which was largely inspired by an OECD report 
and its recommendations. Another attempt to modernize higher education 
was undertaken shortly before the regime fell in 1974. The initiative aimed at 
creating a polytechnic sector, but it was on shaky grounds due to political reasons. 
After the 1974 Portuguese revolution, the society experienced political turmoil 
and chaos caused by rapid democratization and disbanded traditional institutions. 
The Portuguese revolution also had a profound effect on the development of 
higher education. In this stormy time, a growing number of youth increased their 
educational demands. Universities could not cope with such a rapid increase 
in demand for education without deep structural changes. There were limited 
resources, particularly in terms of academic staff and institutional capacity. It was 
obvious that higher education reform was not just a small issue and needed to be 
addressed seriously. Change in the structure of education was a priority for the 
government after the 1974 revolution, but there were also other circumstances 
that had influenced the overall economic and political situation in Portugal. 
Portugal, as a previous colonial power, experienced the independence of its 
African colonies in 1975. After this time, there was a significant influx of people 
to Portugal, representing about a 10 percent increase in the country’s population. 
The Eurydice report pointed out these abrupt changes, which led to social unrest, 
disruptions in the production system, a significant loss in production, and inflation 
that reached 30 percent in the worst years of the 1980s (Eurydice 2000: 443). 
All these factors mentioned above led to reforms in many sectors of the economy, 
including higher education. 
An important step for a new opening in higher education was the declaration of 
the new Constitution in 1976. It guaranteed to all Portuguese citizens the right 
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to education, which together with demographic pressure opened the door for the 
establishment and development of private higher education. This was a relatively 
easy way to solve the problem without increasing public spending. The public 
system was unable to provide the number of places required to meet growing 
demand. In January 1979, the Ministry of Education authorized the first private 
higher education institution. The University Livre and the University Lisbon and 
Porto were formally recognized in 1980 and 1983, respectively. This developing 
of private higher education was possible because of political and economic 
stabilization. The entrance requirements were based on a numerous clausus system, 
which was initially established for medical and veterinary schools (The Decree-Law 
in 1976), and was supported by the World Bank. It was a way of preventing a loss 
of quality in the provision of education. Minister Robert Carneiro decided to widen 
access to higher education in 1989 by relaxing requirements. In that year alone, 
there was an increase of over 20,000 candidates for college application. A political 
decision had enabled thousands of new Portuguese students to go to college. 
By 1996, enrollment in private universities had increased by 36 percent. As Jon 
File notes, notwithstanding its quantitative success, the rise of the private sector 
became a major problem for public authorities because they did not prove to be any 
more responsive to economic needs than the public sector (File 2008: 13–14). 
Loans from the World Bank played an important role in reforming the higher 
education (HE) system, especially in the development of the polytechnic subsystem. 
An idea to create a network of polytechnic schools in every region aimed to train 
technicians and educators. This was based on the presumption that Portugal, as 
a transition economy, needed highly skilled technicians to develop the national 
industry. The polytechnic sector was established in 1977 by the Decree-Law 427-
B/77. As Amaral and Magalhăes (2007: 125) have pointed out, the polytechnic 
sector did not emerge as an attractive option for many students, and its status was 
rather fragile. The problems were threefold. Firstly, the polytechnic schools did not 
have a clear definition of their mission. Secondly, this kind of institution did not have 
the capacity to attract students. Thirdly, students saw polytechnics as a second-best 
choice. A binary organization of the higher education system was established by 
the Education Framework Act of 1986. This was a very important regulation, which 
defined the roles of the universities and the polytechnic schools. Finally, joining 
the European Community in 1986 became a turning point for Portugal and for 
Portuguese higher education. A stream of new structural funds resulted from 
a special program for the development of the education system (Programa de 
desenvolvimento educativo para Portugal). The funds were crucial to developing the 
infrastructure of tertiary educational institutions. In addition, the EU enlargement 
in 1986 opened a window of opportunity for participation in European research and 
educational programs for both students and academics staff, although the level of 
participation was very low for years compared to other countries of similar size.
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3.1. Main characteristics of Portuguese HE governance before 
the reforms
Besides the reforms that introduced new kind of entities in the tertiary-higher 
education system, there were no changes in university governance structure until 
2006. The institutional power structure was based on rectors/presidents and 
various councils at institutional and faculty levels. Both were elected by a body of 
representatives of the academic staff, nonacademic staff, and students. Tertiary 
education institutions could establish their own mission and strategy, but a policy 
framework was regulated by statutes. The level of faculty autonomy varied across 
different institutions. Universities and polytechnics were financed on the basis 
of a complex formula. Private education institutions were established on the 
initiative of firms, cooperatives, or foundations. They needed to be recognized by 
the Ministry of Education. This recognition was based on the quality of internal 
organization, academic staff, buildings, and equipment. The private universities 
and polytechnics were less democratic and more flexible with regard to their 
organizational structures. The rector or president was appointed by the entity 
owning the institution. The Minister of Education was at the central level of 
administration. It enjoyed considerable power over institutional budgets and current 
investments. The Ministry also determined a number of the places that universities 
could offer under each program and controlled the number of academic and 
nonacademic staff. 
 
The development of the higher education system during the 1980s increased 
enrollments but also revealed that deep structural reforms were critically needed. 
The most import issue that still remained unsolved was the numerus clausus 
system. On the other hand, the demographic trends began to change, and the 
number of students enrolled in higher education institutions decreased in the 
mid 1990s. As Ferreira and Hill (2008: 639) pointed out, demographic pressure 
was a major reason for changing the organizational culture in higher education. 
There was a clear need for change, but due to the relatively weak political influence 
and unstable position of the Ministry of Higher Education, the reforms were 
unfortunately postponed. Between 1999 and 2005, there were as many as five 
different ministers of higher education, which largely hampered any attempts to 
reform Portuguese higher education. 
3.2. Major aims of the reforms
Higher education returned to the mainstream political debate with the political 
campaign before the parliamentary election in 2005. There were few doubts that 
Portuguese higher education institutions seemed to be failing in meeting the needs 
of modern society and the post-industrial economy. The parliamentary election 
led to the victory of the social-democratic party and the appointment of Mariano 
Gago to the Ministry of Higher Education. The reforms of higher education were 
inspired by the OECD “Review of Higher Education in Portugal” that was released 
in December 2006. The report was very critical and pointed out the serious 
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weaknesses of Portuguese higher education, including the ineffective university 
governance structure. In particular, the report targeted traditional modes of 
collective decision-making and the participation of students in governance. 
They were attacked for being inefficient, ineffective, cumbersome, and process 
oriented. It was contrary to the needs of the society and the economy (Teixeira 
2005: 501). Following heavy criticism of the governance structure of Portuguese 
universities from various stakeholders, the government took the initiative to 
modernize the higher education law. It aimed to change the structure of university 
governance by reforming the legal structure, which was framed in the amendment. 
The amendment proposed the following changes:
(1) diversifying the governance system and increasing autonomy; 
(2) setting up University Governing Boards with mandatory external participation;
(3) allowing independent legal status for public institutions, namely as public 
foundations governed by private law; 
(4) establishing consortia among institutions; 
(5)  recognizing research centers as part of the university management framework.
The new rules implied a gradual departure from the concept of the university 
as a democratic institution. The amendment increased the number of external 
stakeholders at the expense of student participation in university governance. 
The reforms were built on the foundation of New Public Management, which had 
become a dominant trend in the public realm. As Santiago and colleagues (2006) 
pointed out, there was a tendency in some of the higher education literature to 
assume that “traditional” collegial approaches to academic management were 
being replaced everywhere by executive-orientated management processes. 
The evidence, however, suggests a much more complex and diverse picture. 
Some countries have moved substantially toward what is termed “full-blown” 
academic managerialism (such as the UK and Australia), while other countries 
have traditionally had a strong executive style to running colleges and universities 
(the US), while even others have slowly implemented less collegial management 
orientations. Though it may be concluded that nearly everywhere there are 
pressures for change in the way in which HE institutions are run, the devil and 
a deeper understanding of the processes lies in the detail (R. Santiago et al. 2006: 
216–217).
3.3. New Legal Framework 
The amendment only announced the advent of deeper structural changes that were 
introduced with Law No. 62/2007, enacted on September 10, 2007. The new law 
challenged the existing university governance structure. Article 1 states that the 
act was intended to regulate the “legal framework of higher education institutions, 
specifically governing their constitution, attributions and organization, the duties 
and powers of their various bodies and their guardianship and public supervision by 
the State within the framework of their autonomy.” There were also other changes 
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being introduced, including laws to establish the legal framework for evaluating 
higher education institutions (Law No. 38/2007, enacted August 16, 2007), for 
regulating students loans (Decree-law 82/2007, enacted November 5, 2007), 
and for recognizing foreign academic degrees (Decree-law 341/2007, enacted 
October 12, 2007). The new legal framework gave legal power to higher education 
institutions to determine their own status. Before reform, all universities and 
polytechnics were part of the public sector and therefore operated only under the 
public law. But after the new legislation, a higher education entity could choose 
to become a public foundation, governed by private law, or remain an higher 
education institution, ruled by public law. Regardless of the legal status, all public 
higher education institutions now enjoy statutory, pedagogical, scientific, cultural, 
administrative, financial, and disciplinary autonomy with regard to the state, with 
the appropriate distinctions according to their nature. 
Public higher education institutions may create associations to develop higher 
education and consortiums of higher education institutions. Liaison between 
institutions was also regulated in the law and established the opportunity to freely 
create, amongst themselves or with other institutions, association or cooperation 
agreements to encourage mobility amongst students and teaching staff and in order 
to pursue partnerships and common projects, including joint degree programs as 
prescribed by the law or the sharing of resources and equipment. According to the 
new regulations, higher education institutions may also form associations or 
cooperate with each other for the purposes of institutional representation or 
to coordinate and regulate joint activities and initiatives. According to the new 
legislation (Article 27), government — in regard to higher education — was 
responsible for: creating, modifying, founding, separating, and closing public higher 
education institutions, as well as attributing and revoking recognition of public 
interest in private higher education establishments.
3.4. Statute of university
Public higher education institutions can adopt the institutional organizational and 
management model that they consider most appropriate for their mission and the 
specific context within which they operate. The most important document that 
regulates the internal governing structure is the university statute. Following 
the act, it must regulate: 
(1) the role of the institution; 
(2) the structure of the governance and managerial bodies and their composition, 
the forms of electing or appointing members, the duration of their mandate, 
and the means of dismissing them; 
(3) the powers of the various bodies; 
(4) the autonomous structure of the organizational units and its respective bodies. 
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Alterations to university statutes require the approval of two-thirds of the members 
of the General Council. The structure of university governance applies to public 
universities and polytechnics and is established by Articles 77 and 78 of the Higher 
Education Law. 
Table 2. Main bodies in universities in Portugal
Public Universities or University Institutes
The General Council
The Rector
The Management Board
The Academic Senate or Advisory Body (optional)
Other consultative bodies (as envisaged by the institution)
Scientific Council
Pedagogical Council
3.5. Structure of university governance 
The structure of university governance in Portugal consists of two major layers, 
the central and faculty level. On the central level, three major actors can be named, 
the (1) general council, (2) the rector/president, and (3) the management board. 
The main body in Portuguese governance university structure is the general 
council, a collegial body comprised of 15 to 35 members, depending upon the size 
of each institution and the number of schools and organizational research units. 
The following are members of the general council: 
(a) representatives of teachers and researchers (elected by all the teachers and 
researchers in the higher education institution, constituting more than half of 
the total number of members of the general council); 
(b) student representatives (elected by all the students in the higher education 
institution using a system of proportional representation, constituting at least 
15 percent of the total number of members of the general council); 
(c) individuals of recognized merit who have the relevant knowledge and 
experience but who do not belong to the institution (co-opted by the members 
referred to in (a) and (b) by absolute majority, constituting at least 30 percent of 
the total number of members of the general council).
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The mandate for elected or appointed members is four years, except in the 
case of students for whom it is two years. The general council enjoys strategic 
responsibility, which covers the following tasks:
(a) electing a chairman, by absolute majority from among the members; 
(b) approving its regulations;
(c) approving alterations to statutes;
(d) organizing election procedures and electing the rector or president under the 
terms of the applicable statutes and regulations; 
(e) appraising the acts of the rector or president and the general council; 
(f) proposing initiatives considered necessary for the proper running of the 
institution;
(g) performing any other duties stipulated by law or in the statutes.
 
But if proposed by the rector or president, the general council is responsible for 
the following: 
(a) approving medium-term strategic plans and the plan of action for the four-year 
mandate of the rector or president;
(b) approving the general guidelines for the institution contained in the scientific, 
pedagogical, and financial or asset plan; 
(c) creating, transforming, or closing organizational units;
(d) approving annual plans of activities and assessing the annual report on 
institutional activities; 
(e) approving budget proposals; 
(f) approving the annual consolidated accounts, accompanied by the opinion of the 
statutory auditor; 
(g) setting the tuition fees payable by students; 
(h) proposing or authorizing, as stipulated by law, the purchase or sale of the 
institution’s assets and its credit operations; 
(i) pronouncing on any other matters that may be submitted by the rector or 
president. 
The general council is led by the chairman/chairwoman, who convene and preside 
over the meeting and declare and verify vacancies on the council. Ordinary 
meetings of the GC are held four times a year. The rector or president attends the 
meetings without the right to vote. 
Portugal
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The second key element (actor) of the Portuguese university governance structure 
is the (2) university rector or president, who is the most senior governor and 
external representative of the institution. Rectors (presidents) are elected by the 
general council under the terms established in the statues. Teachers or researchers 
from the institution or from other national or foreign higher education or research 
institutions may be elected as university rectors or polytechnics presidents as 
well as individuals of recognized merit with relevant professional experience. 
The supervising minister may only refuse to approve the election of a rector 
or president on the grounds of ineligibility, illegalities in the election process, 
or violation of the rules and general principles of the Code of Administrative 
Procedures. The rector or president holds a four-year mandate, which may be 
renewed once under the terms of the statutes. The rector or president is assisted by 
the vice-rector and vice-president, which are appointed by the rector or president 
and may come from outside the institution. The rector may present proposals 
to the general council on:  
(a) the medium-term strategic plan of action for their four-year mandate; 
(b) general scientific and pedagogical guidelines for the institution; 
(c) the annual plan and report of activities; 
(d) the budget and annual consolidated accounts, accompanied by the opinion 
of the statutory auditor; 
(e) he purchase and sale of institutional assets and credit operations; 
(f) the creation, transformation, or closing of organizational units;
(g) tuition fees payable by students; 
(h) the creation, suspension, and closing of courses; 
(i) the maximum numbers for new admissions and enrollments; 
(j) the supervision of academic management, namely by deciding on the opening 
of vacancies for candidates, appointing and contracting staff, appointing 
election candidate panels and academic examinations, establishing the system 
and regulations for assessing teaching staff and students; 
(k) administrative and financial management of the institution (and ensuring the 
efficient use of funds and resources); 
(l) support for students within the framework of the student social services, as 
prescribed by law; 
(m) approval of the election and appointment of members of the managerial bodies 
of the organizational units, which have their own governing bodies, rejecting 
them only on the grounds of illegality;
(n)  appointment and dismissal of directors of organizational units that do not have 
their own governing bodies; 
(o) appointment and dismissal of director and managers of the institution’s 
services; and 
(p) any measures necessary to ensure the quality of education and research in the 
institution and its organizational units. 
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The third element of the university governance structure on the central level 
is the management board, which is appointed and presided over by the rector or 
president and consists of a maximum of five members. It is responsible for the 
administrative, asset, and financial management of the institution. In addition, it 
covers the management of human resources and is subject to the current legislation 
pertaining to public bodies with administrative autonomy. The management board 
is also responsible for establishing charges and salaries. On the departmental level, 
the structure of governance is comprised of four major actors. Faculty is led by the 
director or president of the organizational unit who is responsible for: 
(a) representing the organizational unit before the various bodies of the institution 
and outside the institution;
(b) presiding over the managerial body, where it exists, directing the services of the 
organizational unit and approving the necessary regulations; 
(c) executing the decisions of the scientific or technical-scientific council and the 
pedagogic council, when binding; 
(d) drawing up the budget and plan of activities, in addition to the financial report 
and report on activities. The director (president) is supported by the scientific 
and pedagogical councils. 
The scientific council consists of (a) professors and professional researchers; 
(b) other full-time teaching and research staff employed under contracts of not less 
than one year who hold doctorates, regardless of the nature of their employment 
status within the institution; (c) representatives of recognized research who 
have been positively assessed as prescribed by law, where they exist, in numbers 
established in the statutes that amount to not less than 20 percent and not more 
than 40 percent of the total members of the council, but which may be less than 
20 percent when the number of research units is below this figure. The scientific 
or technical-scientific council is specifically responsible for: 
(a) assessing the academic plan of activities for the unit or institution; 
(b) deciding upon the creation, transformation, or closure of the institution’s 
organizational units;
(c) deciding upon the distribution of teaching duties, subject to approval by the 
rector or president or the director of the school, as appropriate; 
(d) performing other duties stipulated by law relating to the career structure of the 
teaching and research staff and the recruitment of teaching and research staff. 
The second body is the pedagogical council, which consists of an equal number 
of representatives from the teaching and student body of the institution or 
school, elected under the terms established in the statutes and regulations. 
The pedagogical council is responsible for: 
(a) deciding upon pedagogical guidelines and teaching and assessment methods;
(b) launching regular inquiries into the pedagogical performance of the 
organizational unit or institution and analyzing and publishing the results; 
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(c) promoting the assessment of the pedagogical performance of teachers and 
students and analyzing and publishing the results.
3.6. Universities as foundations under private law 
According to the Law 62/2007, higher education institutions may choose 
alternative statutes based on the private law. The procedure is very simple and 
is comprised of the following steps. The proposal to shift the legal status of the 
foundation is made by the rector or president of the university and must be 
approved by an absolute majority of the members of the general council. Then the 
agreement is made between the government and the institution. The agreement 
can be signed if the institution prepares an appropriate study of implications 
of this change in regards to funding, management, and autonomy. In 
addition, higher education institution should determine the institution’s plan, 
the development program, the status of its foundation, the basic organizational 
structure, and the transition process. Foundations are created by Decree-Law, 
which also approves their statutes. Universities operating under the private law 
have a different governance structure. At the top of the university is a council 
of trustees, consisting of five individuals of exceptional merit with professional 
experience recognized as particularly relevant. Formally, trustees are appointed 
by the government, although the recommendation is made by a university. 
They serve a five-year mandate, which may be renewed once only and may 
not be dismissed by the government without due cause. Public higher education 
institutions with the status of foundations enjoy autonomy under the same terms 
as public higher education institutions, with any due alterations resulting from their 
status. The council of trustees is bridging universities with society, and its major 
responsibilities carry the duties of (a) appointing and dismissing the managerial 
board on the recommendations of the rector, director or president; (b) ratifying 
decisions of the general council on the appointment or dismissal of the rector, 
director, or president; (c) exercising the powers relating to the same duties as the 
rector or president in public higher education institutions; and (d) ratifying decisions 
of the general council. The main difference between the two kinds of higher 
education institutions mentioned above is that the foundations are governed by 
private law, specifically with regard to their financial assets and staff management. 
Beside this disparity, entrance requirements for students are the same as in public 
universities or polytechnics. 
One study of the evaluation of the reforms among the academic community shows 
a mixed picture (Teixeira 2009). All of the interviewees were certain that it was 
too early to evaluate the effects of the governance reform. But in the academic 
community, there was a mixture of acceptance, debate, criticism, and rejection. 
According to Teixeira (2009: 507), one view of the reform is that universities 
have lost their democratic character. On the other hand, some see it as a good 
way to modernize university management and promote cooperation between 
HE institutions and society, and in that way, it is a good opportunity to change 
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the system in a desirable direction. As for the composition of the new institutional 
arrangements, respondents were against the senate’s marginalization, which was 
reduced by 30 percent of its previous number. However, it is worth acknowledging 
that external participation in higher education institutions was judged in a positive 
way. Interviewees pointed out that such inclusion in the decision-making process 
and collaboration with society could have a positive impact in the higher education 
system. A few doubts were mentioned on the question of who should choose 
the external members. The vast majority of respondents did not understand the 
advantages of public foundations guided by private law. They were afraid that this 
new form of higher education institution could be treated in a different way, but they 
could not be specific. In conclusion, all interviewees asserted that higher education 
reform could not work in an appropriate way without proper financing from the 
state. Overall, university foundations have a few advantages. First, institutional 
leadership has the maximum autonomy to pursue its goals with little external 
constraint. Second, institutional leadership can plan for the long term without being 
subjected to changes in the government’s budgetary policies. Third, there are new 
opportunities for generating additional resources. Fourth, the strategic influence 
wielded by the curators regarding the establishment of institutional and research 
agendas can lead to closer collaboration with external stakeholders in the university. 
Finally accountability is placed on the shoulders of those in whom responsibility 
rests.
4. Austria
Austria is a small landlocked country of roughly 8.47 million people with a Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 50.546 USD. According to OCED (2015:231) 
public and private spending on tertiary education is estimated around 1.5% GDP. 
None of Austrian universities is ranked in global top-100, but University of Vienna is 
in Top-200 and two others in top-300 in world rankings.
The country has developed a high standard of living and in 2011 was ranked 19th in 
the world for its Human Development Index. Since 1945, a single-party government 
has been in place 1966–1970 (Conservatives) and 1970–1983 (Social Democrats). 
During all other legislative periods, either a grand coalition of Conservatives and 
Social Democrats or a “small coalition” (one of these two and a smaller party) ruled 
the country. As a result of the reforms since the 1960s, the university system 
has changed from one serving the elite to one serving the masses. The increasing 
number of students at Austrian universities reflects the liberalization of educational 
policy at secondary and higher levels. Between the 1955–56 and 1991–92 
academic years, the number of students enrolled in institutions of higher education 
increased from about 19,000 to more than 200,000. The number of students 
beginning university-level education after having completed the qualifying AHS 
program also increased and amounted to 85 percent of the age cohort in 1990, 
compared with 60 percent in the mid-1960s (Austria 1990: 190). 
4.1. National bodies in higher education and research
The Austrian Federal Ministry for Education, Science, and Culture (BWK) is the 
main public body responsible for schools, universities and Fachhochschulen. 
Other federal ministries, as well as provincial and regional authorities, also deal 
with educational issues. The Federal Minister for Education is the political head 
of the BWK. Apart from education, BWK is also responsible for some areas of 
cultural affairs, for the relationship between the State and the churches, and for 
adult education. Several bodies with consultative status are affiliated with the 
ministry, e.g., the School Reform Commission, the Centre for School Development 
(with offices in Vienna, Graz and Klagenfurt), the Commission for Minority 
Education, the Commission for Minority Schooling in Carinthia, and the Advisory 
Commission for Technical and Vocational Education and Training.
Under the Austrian Constitution, legislation and execution of all matters 
pertaining to universities and higher education are a federal responsibility. 
The freedom of scholarship and teaching, and the freedom of expression in art 
are guaranteed in constitutional legislation. Universities are autonomous legal 
entities under the public law. They regulate specific matters autonomously 
according to their institutional statutes. According to the Universities Act of 
2002, the Federal Minister has legal supervision of university activities as regards 
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compliance with the law, ministerial orders, and the legal statute. There are no 
provisions for the Federal Minister to perform any other type of supervision, for 
example, to review whether university activities are appropriate and economical. 
4.2. Legacy of Austrian Universities 
In 1365, Duke Rudolf IV of Austria founded the University of Vienna, which is the 
oldest university in the German-speaking world. The University of Vienna succeeded 
in achieving relatively far-reaching autonomy vis-à-vis the country’s rulers and 
the church and experienced a genuinely golden age. In the wake of the Counter-
Reformation, the University of Graz was also founded. It emerged in 1585 from an 
already existing Jesuits’ college and was the type of university intended purely for 
the religious order of the Jesuits. The University of Salzburg was founded in 1622, 
and the University of Innsbruck followed in 1669. In the 17th and 18th centuries 
there were thus four universities, which had no autonomy with regard to their 
organization or curriculum but were under church influence and thus excluded 
from the development of modern science. The entire school system was redesigned 
under Maria Theresa and Joseph II. The universities were reorganized and 
transformed into state institutions. Although these reforms were largely revoked 
after the death of Joseph II, one thing that did remain, however, was the fact that 
universities had become public institutes under state control. In the first half of the 
19th century, the universities have been changed. The University of Salzburg was 
closed under Bavarian rule in 1810, and the lyceums in Innsbruck (1826) and Graz 
(1827) were reestablished as universities. In addition, the precursors of today’s 
universities of technology came into being in Vienna and Graz. As a result, the state 
came to guarantee the freedom of teaching and learning, and new structures were 
designed for the teaching qualifications, and the appointment of professors and 
the administration. Access to the universities was newly organized by introducing 
a secondary school education ending with the school-leaving examination. 
A tremendous expansion program for the universities in terms of technical, 
human, and material resources accompanied this organizational and study reform. 
After the collapse of the monarchy, the republic continued to operate the Austrian 
universities and institutions of higher education as state institutions. After World 
War II, the Austrian university laws were re-instituted and teaching resumed shortly 
afterwards. Until 1955, a great number of confusing university laws from the 
19th century applied to the universities. When the University Organization Act was 
adopted in 1955, one single law applicable to all scientific universities and higher-
education institutions was enacted for the first time without, however, any major 
substantive innovations regarding their organizational structure. So the university 
organization of the 19th century remained in place, partly unchanged, until the  
re-organization of the universities in the 1970s. Hans Pechar (2005) has 
distinguished two phases of reforms in the higher education system in 
Austria. Both periods had a background philosophy. The first phase referred to 
“democratization of universities,” and “opening higher education” reached its 
peak in the mid 1970s ,while the second phase was focused on “deregulation” 
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and “efficiency” and transformed universities from agencies of the welfare state to 
public enterprises. 
4.3. Phase 1: Democratization of Austrian universities 
Several events in higher education policy took place in the 1960s. After World 
War II, Austrian universities were in bad condition and largely decoupled from 
the society. Austrian higher education reflected the elite model in Martin 
Trow’s typology, having student participation rates below the level of 5 percent. 
Universities were more places of intellectual narrowness than sources of innovation 
(Pechar 2005a: 2). In the late 1960s, the elite model of higher education came 
to be seriously questioned in both political and economic terms. This was all 
because the expectations from human capital had changed. It was associated 
with the human capital theory, which was popularized and disseminated by the 
OECD. Human capital theory (e.g., Schultz 1971; Sakamota & Powers 1995; 
Psacharopoulos & Woodhall 1997) rests on the assumption that education is 
highly instrumental and even necessary to improve the production capacity of 
a population. The important goal was growth in the qualifications of manpower, and 
an outdated system of higher education in the existing form was not acceptable. 
The government set the course for educational expansion and modified the 
traditional chair system. In the traditional chair system, self-governance was 
restricted to the small group of full professors known as the “academic oligarchy” 
(Clark 1983). The university as an organization was an assembly of a number of 
small “principalities,” which were managed and controlled individually by the master 
— a full professor who held the chair. The plight of the junior faculty was uneasy and 
was characterized by entirely personal dependency on the chair holders. The first 
phase of reforms took place in the middle 1970s, bringing higher education under 
the umbrella of the welfare state, modifying the chair system at universities, and 
engaging a more diverse representation of the academic community in decision-
making process. Pechar claims that the reforms were underpinned by values 
that reflected the spirit of the times, which was characterized by “openness” 
and “democratization” of higher education (Pechar 2005a: 1). This implied the 
increase of student and junior academic participation in the decision-making 
process and their growing role in the university governance structure. (Pechar 
2005b: 4-5). The goal was to open the rigid structures of the self-governance 
system to those who had been underrepresented (or had not been represented at 
all). Pechar points to three dimensions of openness and democratization of 
the university. The most important was to increase students’ participation 
by removing visible and hidden barriers that excluded large numbers of talented 
students. It was assumed that financial barriers were mainly responsible for the 
low participation rate. The second dimension referred to widening the spectrum 
of recognized disciplines and methodological approaches at the university, 
which was very much outdated. It applied to great specialization of science in 
both teaching and research. The structures and procedures of self-governance 
at universities were made more democratic. Junior faculty and students were 
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partially included in the procedures of academic self-governance (Pechar 2005b: 
4–6). The majority of university actors did not adopt the new sets of ideas for higher 
education initiated by the Austrian government. They believed that the prospect of 
increased participation in decision-making by taking on board students and junior 
academics would seriously threaten their privileges and lower their status. Hence, 
they responded negatively to the political request to open up their institutions. 
Such a hostile reception should not have been a surprise, as Austrian universities 
enjoyed very privileged positions and special care from the benevolent state. 
They had little appetite for enrolling a bigger number of students because they felt 
(rightly) that expansion of higher education would eventually lead to abolishing the 
privileges of elite institutions. In the 1970s, the increase in the number of students 
was estimated at approximately 10 percent. The growth of enrollments was 
followed by an increase of academic appointments in higher education. Obviously, 
the new appointments were mainly junior faculty members, who assumed the least 
prestigious new teaching functions, but their arrival slowly changed the balance 
of power at universities. A growing number of junior academics received some 
kind of representation in collegial bodies. This change led to inevitable conflicts 
between professors and junior faculty members. A majority of the academic 
oligarchy strongly opposed the higher education reforms, so the government had 
to enforce it by legislation and other means of regulation. The fundamental reform 
of governance and the internal organization of universities was passed in 1975. 
The new law increased the status of junior faculty and gave some voice to students. 
And it was a first step to modernize the traditional chair system by introducing 
larger organizational units (institutes). The UOG 1975 law was extremely 
controversial and viciously opposed by the professors. Some of them — immediately 
after the introduction of the new law — sued the state at the constitutional court but 
failed to win the case (Pechar 2005b: 5). Despite the cold reception, the reforms 
were put into life.
4.4. Phase 2: Modernization of Austrian Universities 
In the mid 1980s, the number of students was still on the rise, and conflicts 
between senior and junior academics did not dry out. However, a new potential 
threat appeared on the political horizon. It was the collapsed of trust and confidence 
in the welfare state. It implied undermining traditional order in higher education, 
including the university governance system, and in general, the university as we 
know it. Hans Pechar identified major circumstances that heralded the inevitability 
of the fundamental changes ahead. First, there was an increase in the number 
of students, academic staff, and nonacademics staff who contributed to the 
managerial complexity of running the university. As universities got bigger, more 
complex, and more diverse, they also became less manageable in the traditional 
way. In addition, in the 1980s there was a widely shared belief that universities 
were surrounded by the ossified state bureaucracy, which did not allow them to 
develop their full potential. On the top of it, the crisis of public finances in the 
late 1980s (the tax consolidation) meant that it was necessary to reject growing 
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requests for more resources, and even worse, it led to cuts in spending on higher 
education. Under these difficult circumstances, life became more complicated for 
all the stakeholders of higher education. The relations between the representatives 
of the government and the higher education community gradually deteriorated. 
The former had no interest in being engaged in the ugly details of executing cuts 
and became quite sympathetic to the arguments for increasing the autonomy of 
higher education institutions (Pechar 2005b: 5). 
The second phase of reforms reflected a new managerial trend in public policy 
that became fashionable in the 1990s in a number of countries across Europe. 
It was built on the liberal ideology of New Public Management. It largely influenced 
the University Act (2002), which established universities as full legal entities. 
The new sets of values that underpinned the course of university reforms were 
“deregulation” (de Boer, Enders, & Schimank 2006: 9), “effectiveness,” and 
“efficiency” (Pechar 2005a: 1). The most fundamental change in higher education 
embraced shifting the legal status of universities from state agencies to public 
enterprises. It aimed to provide more autonomy to higher education institutions 
but at the same time expanded their responsibilities for their performance. In other 
words, the reform moved the focus from orientation on “the process of teaching 
and research” to “the outcomes of teaching and research.” This apparently 
insignificant change had profound and far-reaching consequences for higher 
education. Another political step in reforming higher education policy was 
marked by the general election of 1990. Both partners of the reelected coalition 
— the Social Democrats (SPO) and the Christian Democratic Austrian People`s 
Party (OVP) — started discussions about serious reforms of public policy, including 
plans for university reform. And a new law of higher education was to pave the 
way for further deregulation and decentralization. The main goal of the reform 
was to reestablish the planning and decision-making ability of universities, 
to increase flexibility with regard to staff work contracts, and to establish 
clear connections of responsibility. The ruling coalition took into consideration 
the democratic participation of all groups of university staff. In December 1991, 
conservative Minister of Education Erhard Busek presented the first guidelines of 
reform in the “Green Paper.” It included the following proposals: 
(1) complement the management structure of universities (Senate headed by the 
rector) with a parallel management structure, headed by manager nominated 
by the minister; 
(2) establish one-time payment of funds for the university;
(3) assign decision-making authority over how to use the funds to the bureau,;
(4) create an external board at each university to play an advisory role; 
(5) authorize two categories of academic staff: civil service and those working on 
contracts. 
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The proposal was absolutely rejected by all the major groups in higher education 
This heavy criticism came from two opposite directions. The left, including most 
of the students and junior faculty, claimed that it was a return to the authoritarian 
professors, who controlled academia before the 1970s. Conservatives, representing 
a minority of professors and young academic staff, felt that the new management 
structure threatened the status and privileges of the university oligarchy. 
4.5. The University Organization Act (UOG) 1993
The process of political consultation of the changes proposed was like a roller 
coaster full of unexpected twists. In October 1993, the new law, the University 
Organization Act 1993 (Das Universitätsorganisationsgesetz, German abbreviation 
UOG). It passed through Parliament, giving the universities increasingly more 
scope for decisions and configurations, which was the first step towards full 
autonomy (Kasparovsky & Wadsack 2004: 12). Pechar and Pellert (1998: 144) 
characterized the UOG 1993 as “soft managerialism.” Some researchers saw 
the UOA 1993 as a first step towards the development of universities from state 
agencies to independently managed public institutions (Lanzerdorf 2006: 108). 
Following Ute Lanzerdorf, the government specified the act as the document 
developing democratically constituted universities as autonomous institutions 
with individual responsibility for their performance (Lanzerdorf 2006: 108). 
Another argument was that with the increasing number of students, universities 
should therefore be larger organizations, which needed more personal decision-
making structures and more equitable participation of the different staff categories. 
Until the end of 1999, “UOG 1993” had not been adopted in all universities 
(especially in the largest: Vienna, Graz, Innsbruck, and Salzburg). The country-wide 
implementation ended in 1999. Meanwhile, in 1998, the first attempt to give full 
legal entity to universities took place. But it was pointed out that the adjustment 
provided schools with choices. Universities could keep their old structures, and 
changes required the consent of the senate. The proposal especially helped 
small universities that wished to go forward against bigger schools, which would 
implement the changes much more slowly. Universities could choose whether to 
participate in the reform or not.
The most important consequence of UOG 1993 was the strengthening of the 
positions of rector and deans, who became more powerful figures within the 
organization than before, although their power was softened (compared to what the 
government initially proposed) by the significant influence of the collegial bodies. 
By and large, this direction of change reflected the mainstream development 
in European countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The first attempts to involve 
external stakeholders were made, even though the academic community strongly 
opposed any form of governing body that would engage representatives of external 
stakeholders. As a result, these governing bodies were introduced as advisory 
bodies with no organizational power. The concept of reforms was underpinned 
by the NPM approach to universities and heavily influenced by the Anglo-Saxon 
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policy. UOA 1993 made the first step by only signaling forthcoming deep structural 
changes in university governance. UOA 1993 was just an intermediary statute, 
and managerial revolution was just around the corner. The reform outcomes 
also brought some rather unexpected but important alternations. Beyond the 
main stream of modernizations to governance structure, the new approach to 
universities revolutionized the academic community. Hans Pechar (2005) identified 
these changes, drawing attention to a new wave of senior academics who became 
more sensitive to external needs and pressures: 
They could no longer be regarded as the groups that represents the internal 
interests of academe, but increasingly they were viewed as mediating power 
block between internal and external pressure. (Pechar 2005: 280)
4.6. The reform triad
Another shift in higher education policy was heralded when the parliamentary 
elections in Austria were held in Austria in 1999. The program of reforming 
higher education outlined a radical move toward deregulation and decentralization 
of universities. This was associated with the internationalization of European 
higher education and the fact that Austrian universities did not meet government 
expectations as to international visibility. Government plans were to establish 
complete institutional autonomy, provide agreements on the financing of 
universities, enact new regulations associated with hiring new employees, 
decrease the bureaucratization of university administrations, implement regular 
evaluations, and enhance the individual profiles of universities. The most important 
change in higher education in the last decade was the University Act published 
in August 2002, which is known in the literature as the “Reform Triad,” which 
included (1) university autonomy, (2) the deregulation of the personnel law, 
and (3) the definition of university profiles. The University Organization and 
Studies Act was passed by OVP Education Minister Elisabeth Gehrer in August 2002 
(Lanzendorf 2006: 110). Universities gained full organizational autonomy and 
were transformed into legal entities under public law and divested from the federal 
administration system. The aim was to create “university enterprises” in the 
future, which would be in the position to access new funding sources in addition to 
the money received from the federal government (Kasparovsky, Wadsack 2004: 
12). Essentially, the universities became legal entities under public law, having 
their own legal personality. They could act free from any instructions and regulate 
their specific matters autonomously, although the federal minister could legally 
supervise their activities. There are no provisions for the federal minister to perform 
any other type of supervision, for example, to review whether their activities are 
appropriate and economical. Universities became free to design the structure 
of their organizations (including faculties, departments, institutes, university 
libraries, and service facilities). The state is obliged to provide the universities with 
funds. The responsible federal minister enters into a performance agreement with 
every university for a term of three years (first effective in 2007). The university 
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provides the draft of the performance agreement, which is subject to negotiation.2 
Approximately 20 percent of the budget is determined by indicators. The statutory 
budget regulations of the federal authorities are not applied. Twenty percent of 
the total budget for all universities is allocated in line with a formula, based 
on performance indicators and indicators for the objectives of society. Eighty 
percent of the total budget is distributed among the different universities on 
the basis of negotiations of their performance agreements. 
In the future, the three-year global budget of the individual universities will 
thus comprise a formula-based budget and a negotiated budget (basic budget). 
The universities submit their proposals for the performance agreements, which 
are based on the framework laid down by law. The reforms were built on the 
assumption that universities must seek to attract additional funding sources both 
from the free market and also the public realm. Since they have become fully 
fledged legal entities, they may acquire property, conduct research on a commission 
basis, and use this income for meeting their tasks as universities. It is worth 
mentioning that universities are able to establish credit with private banks, but the 
government accepts no liability. On the top of that, the universities are obliged to 
introduce a university-specific accounting system, which replaces the government’s 
cameralistic style of accounting and is guided by commercial accounting principles. 
They must present to the Federal Minister of Education, Science, and Culture an 
opening balance sheet. The federal minister is required to report to the National 
Council (Kasparovsky, Wadsack 2004: 20–21).
The university is the employer of its staff. Under the UA 2002, new staff is 
contracted by the rector at the request of the head of the institute. Staff is 
employed under the private law contracts, which implies a high degree of 
flexibility but also insecurity of employment relations. Before the UA 2002, 
professors were employed by the minister and had civil servant status. Under 
the University Act of 2002, the heads of university administration are directly 
responsible to the rector (not to the federal ministry). Heads of organizational 
units must be university professors, appointed by the rector at the proposal 
of the chair holders of the organizational units. 
4.7. The university governance structure
The “Universities Act 2002” contains detailed tasks of the governing bodies and 
officers at the universities. The senior governing bodies of the university are 
(1) the university council, (2) the rectorate, and (3) the senate. 
2  Similar performance agreements are underway in the Netherlands.
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Table 3. Main Bodies of the university structure in Austria
University Council 
Rectorate
Senate
Deans
Faculty Senate
The membership of more than one of these senior bodies is impermissible. 
The university council is the far most important governance body. It consists of 
five, seven, or nine members, who shall be past or present holders of responsible 
positions, especially in academic, cultural, or business life, and whose specific 
knowledge and experience are such as to enable them to contribute to the 
attainment of the objectives and the fulfillment of the tasks of the university. 
Forty percent of them are appointed by the minister, 40 percent are appointed 
by the academic community (the senate), and one person is appointed by a joint 
decision of the appointed members. In regards to tasks performed, the university 
council has strategic and supervisory functions. It elects and dismisses the 
rector and the vice-rector(s). The strategic tasks primarily relate to the approval 
of the development plan, the intra-university structural organization (organizational 
plan), and the drafting of the performance agreement with the federal authorities, 
as well as to arrange for external evaluations and to be involved in decisions on 
the range of studies and in the drawing up of curricula. The supervisory functions, 
including supervision of legal matters and efficiency, include the preparation of the 
performance report and the knowledge survey, and the closing of accounts. Among 
the main tasks prescribed to the university council, one should underscore:
(a) approving the development plan, the organization plan, and the draft 
performance report;
(b) electing the rector from a short list of nominees proposed by the senate and 
the vice-rectors, after receiving the senate’s opinion thereon; 
(c) concluding the performance agreements with the rector and the rectorate; 
(d) dismissing the rector and the vice-rector(s); 
(e) approving the establishment of companies and foundations as well as 
shareholding in companies; 
(f) approving the guidelines for financial management, the financial statements, 
and the intellectual capital report of the rectorate and forwarding the same to 
the federal minister;
(g) appointing an auditor to audit the financial statements of the university; 
(h) approving the assumption of non-current liabilities and empowering the 
rectorate to assume such liabilities up to a certain limit without seeking the 
prior approval of the university council;
(i) approving the proposed budget; 
(j) preparing an opinion on the performance agreement prior to its conclusion by 
the rector within three weeks.
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The rectorate (one rector and up to four vice-rectors) is the operational body of 
a university, and all university facilities are under its control. All central executive 
tasks are vested in the rectorate, among which the most important is preparation 
of an organizational plan. However, the plan shall require the approval of the 
university council. The rectorate shall ensure that sufficient resources are allocated 
to such organizational units to enable them to fulfill their tasks. The chairperson 
and spokesperson of the rectorate is the rector. Under the “University Act” 2002, 
the rectorate must draft a development plan for submission to the senate and the 
university council. Moreover, the rectorate presents a draft performance agreement 
and development agreement for submission to the university council. Within the 
framework of managerial responsibility, the rectorate also appoints and dismisses 
the heads of organizational units, concludes target agreements with the heads 
of organizational units, prepares a draft budget for submission to the university 
council, and manages the budget. Last but not least, it exercises a wide range 
of operational duties, such as admitting students, determining the course fees, 
collecting tuition fees in the amount provided for by the statute, and establishing 
and discontinuing study programs. The rector is the chairperson of a rectorate. 
He or she represents the university vis-à-vis the federal minister when entering 
into performance agreements, appoints the university professors on the basis of 
proposals by an appointment committee, and signs the employment contracts of 
the university staff members and is their highest superior. The rector acts as the 
superior of all university staff. The rector is selected from a short list of three 
candidates proposed by the senate and is appointed for a term of four years. 
Only individuals with international experience and the necessary abilities to manage 
a university’s organization and finances may be selected as rector. The university 
council is responsible for the announcement of the contest. A reelection is 
permissible. It is worth acknowledging that the rectorate is the main executive 
body at the university, employs the most central executive functions, and is 
responsible for running the university. However, regarding key decisions for 
the university, it is directly accountable to the university council. There are 
18 to 26 members of the senate who serve a three-year term. The university 
senate consists of representatives of all internal stakeholders of the university, 
and specifically (if the senate consists of 18 members), nine senior academic staff, 
including heads of organizational units with research and teaching responsibilities; 
four representatives of the group of associate professors as well as the other 
scientific, artistic, and teaching staff; four representatives of the students, and one 
representative of the nonacademic university staff (more: Kasparovsky and Wadsak 
2004; Pechar 2005; 2005b)(Pechar & Pellert, 1997). 
The university senate performs a number of important duties, among which the 
most important are: 
(a) enacting and amending the statute as proposed by the rectorate; 
(b) approving the draft development and organization plan, changing the size of 
the university council, and electing its members; 
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(c) participating in procedures for the dismissal of members of the university 
council, the rector, or vice-rectors;
(d) appointing collegial bodies with or without decision-making power; 
(e) approving the implementation of decisions by collegial bodies with decision-
making power. 
In short, the university senate has a supportive role that helps the 
representatives of the academic community and provides member of the 
senate an opportunity to participate in major decisions concerning internal 
university matters. In comparison to the past arrangements of university 
governance, the new role of the senate is rather limited.
In conclusion, it should be noted that since the 1970s, the governance 
structure of Austrian universities has undergone a fundamental transformation 
from a “corporation of professors” to a “university as public entrepreneurial 
organization.” The new model is based on managerial self-governance, which 
encompass the leadership triad: the university council, the rectorate, and 
a disempowered senate. The UA 2002, §19 stipulates that each university must 
establish rules for election of the university council, the rectorate, member of 
the senate, and other bodies in its statues. A very important change under UA 
2002 is that the position of rector is a full-time job. The only preconditions for 
becoming a rector are international experience and the capacity to assume 
the organizational and financial leadership of the university (UA 2002, §23). 
Rectors no longer have to be an academic or have working experience at the 
university where he or she is going to work. Also, the role of deans has been 
strengthened by UA 2002. They have to conclude performance agreements with 
the rector for their departments and with the heads of the institutes that belong 
to their departments. They also distribute the available resources according to the 
performance of the institutes and develop strategic plans for the departments. 
In managerial self-governance in Austria, we can observe a change in the style of 
leadership. The individual styles of governance rectors and deans will be decisive 
for the intra-university consequences of the new state-university relationship 
(Lanzendorf 2006: 123). Rectors and deans cannot obligate professors to engage 
in certain activities, but they can put pressure on them by means of performance-
related resource allocations. 
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The analysis of higher education reforms in Portugal, the Netherlands, and Austria 
shows that the reforms progressed in a similar direction and also passed through 
similar stages in restructuring university governance. It is no surprise that in the 
analyzed countries, circumstances under which the reforms of higher education 
were implemented reveal some distinct differences due to peculiar political and 
economic situations. Reforms were also implemented at different periods of 
time, namely between 1990 and 2005. Despite all the differences, there is 
a common element in the reforms, in particular, regarding changes in university 
governance. In addition, Bleikklie and Kogan (2007) noted that the patterns of 
new organization arrangements and the major reasons that led to the reforms are 
similar in each case. One of the major comprehensive documents published recently 
in this matter, “Progress in higher education reform across Europe. Governance 
and Funding Reform,” (European Commission 2008) also finds a common pattern 
in changes of university governance, identifying major drivers for changes in 
university governance in Europe in the 1990s. This pattern was the foundation for 
reforms in the Netherlands, Austria, and (to lesser extent) in Portugal. 
5.1. Background of the reforms
The researched countries exhibited some major similarities of socio-economic 
circumstances under which the reforms of university governance took place. 
Despite local peculiarities, the reforms have grown on common political soil 
and also had similar aims to achieve. Many scholars (e.g., Kwiek 2000; Esping-
Andersen 1990) see it as a more fundamental change of the welfare state that 
revolutionized the public sector. At the end of 1980s, most European countries 
reported significant cutbacks in public spending that also touched the university 
sector. Therefore, good and stable relationships between the states and universities 
underwent serious turbulence. Pechar provides a good description of the political 
climate in Austria before the reforms took off (2003:81):
Life became more difficult for all stakeholders, and relations between the 
representatives of the government and the higher education community 
deteriorated. The former has no interest in being engaged in the ugly details 
of executing cuts and became quite sympathetic to the arguments for 
increasing the autonomy of higher education institutions. 
Very similar observations can be made in the Netherlands, and to some extent in 
Portugal, where the welfare state tottered to its foundation. The failing welfare 
state led inevitably to a situation in which governments saw themselves as less 
responsible for higher education as an absolute duty (Peter Scott 1995: 80). But 
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governments could not just ignore their internal situation in higher education 
because expansion of higher education in all three countries was in an advanced 
stage, which put universities under strong political and economic pressure. 
In all our reference countries, the heavy presence of detailed state regulations in 
higher education has been reported, as in many other parts of the public sector. 
In addition, a far-reaching conservatism in various aspects of education and 
management was present, in particular, in adjusting education to the needs of the 
labor market. Furthermore, weak horizontal diversification and a strong feeling 
that education provided by universities did not address the needs of the external 
world (market) posed serious questions about the accountability of higher education 
and the role of the government in the provision of higher learning. A large part of 
the blame was pointed at the deliberative university governance model, unclear 
accountability, and weak links with the outside world. The first attempts to reform 
governance in higher education were undertaken in the 1980s, but beside some 
adventurous policy papers, little had been done to address the major problems 
of university governance. Growing criticism of universities underscored that the 
deliberative model of university governance relied on cumbersome and time-
consuming method of decision-making. But deliberation holds the benefits of 
democracy (Bohman and Rehg 1997; Habermas 1984), including consensus-
building capacity, superiority in comparison to bargaining, mutual learning, deeper 
integration, and legitimate governance (see more: Hoareau 2012: 530). But in 
the 1980s, the deliberative university governance model was seen as outdated, 
inefficient, inward looking, and trapped by a time-consuming and too-cumbersome 
decision-making process. While the mainstream thinking in the 1980s begins to 
be dominated by the assumption that higher education institutions operate in 
increasingly competitive and transitional environments. And to succeed in these 
markets, higher education needed corporate actors instead of a fragmented 
power structure. Schools, they said, needed to be able to compete for scarce 
resources (de Boer, Enders, & Leisyte 2007). The government found it hard to 
communicate with universities and, as in the Netherlands, “was slightly frustrated 
by not having a clear address to do business with” (de Boer 2009: 34). But also in 
Portugal and Austria, there was a widely shared feeling that universities were too 
inward driven, with a nontransparent structure of governance that was decoupled 
from reality. The elite universities were driven by professional accountability, but 
with the massification of higher education, an inward-looking system could no 
longer work. The concept of universities as loosely coupled systems, institutions 
of representative democracy, or simply republics of scholars (Bleikle, Kogan: 
2007) based on a consensus culture appeared to be highly ineffective in the fierce 
international competition for scarce resources. Therefore, governments encouraged 
to link them with wider society and also engage them in economic development 
by encouraging them to supply a skilled workforce and provide research-based 
expertise. Finally, as early as in the 1980s, the first symptoms of a new phase of 
internationalization of higher education began to emerge, which was particularly 
important for the universities in the Netherlands and Austria that enjoyed a solid 
international reputation. It became clear that universities could no longer rely on 
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the welfare state and public funding supplied by the nation-state. With a globalizing 
world, a wide range of new transnational opportunities started to emerge, but 
unlike the stability of welfare state, these opportunities were available only on 
a competitive basis. Gradually, international benchmarking also became an issue, 
although world university rankings are a product of 21st century. Generally, the 
advent of some kind of international benchmarking was somehow inevitable. As 
Harry de Boer (2009: 33) claimed, “games without frontiers” required new rules, 
new institutional settings, and a rethinking of traditional university governance. 
Despite different national academic traditions and dissimilar institutional 
environments, one can easily identify striking similarities in the reform processes. 
Failing welfare states, strong economic recessions, poor responses to societal 
needs, unclear accountability, and opportunities as well as pressures of globalization 
changed the universities’ external environment. There were external change 
drivers that forced governments to undertake the required measures in order to 
adapt universities to the growing challenges. Various aspects of higher education 
simply did not suit the competitive and more international environment. The main 
criticism (that came largely from outside the university) of higher education was 
that university governance was generally seen as a weak spot and was not fit to 
enable and facilitate universities’ performance in an increasingly competitive world. 
Thus, it should be no surprise that university governance hit the front page of 
higher education reform agendas as a major obstacle for strengthening excellence 
and securing the university’s socio-economic relevance.
5.2. Implementation context
Responding to growing political dissatisfaction with the performance of higher 
education, governments in all three countries undertook some measures in order to 
modernize the university governance model. But the move from paper to practice 
was a very challenging, contentious, and often hostile activity (Trader-Leigh 2002) 
that could easily be squandered by poor implementation.
It is hard to design public policies and programs that look good on paper. 
It is harder still to formulate them in words and slogans that resonate 
pleasingly in the ears of political leaders and the constituencies to which 
they are responsive. And it is excruciatingly hard to implement them in a way 
that pleases anyone at all, including the supposed beneficiaries or clients. 
(Bardach 1977: 3)
Policy implementation varies significantly between the reference countries 
due to different political and social contexts, national academic traditions, and 
various institutional settings. In addition, some policy problems are too complex 
to formulate clear goals in a short- or medium-term perspective. De Boer, Enders 
and Weserheijden (2007: 99) summarize the problem: ”We would like to have 
measurable, clear and specific goals to assess the implementation of a program 
but usually we have to cope with the opposite.” There is a large body of literature 
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on implementation, starting with a classic piece of work by Cerych and Sabatier 
(1986), “Great Expectations and Mixed Performance: The Implementation of Higher 
Education Reforms in Europe,” followed by book edited by Ase Gornitzka, Maurice 
Kogan, and Alberto Amaral “Reforms and Change in Higher Education.”(2005). 
These works show that, to a large extent, every implementation process is unique 
and brings some skepticism toward “a list of conductive factors conducive to the 
achievement of reform objectives.” The issue of policy implementation has become 
a separate and serious field of study. But due to specific goals of this analysis, the 
process of implementation will not receive much attention, but we will only give 
some consideration to the implementation context. The reforms were inspired 
and largely driven by governments. Frankly speaking, they were also implemented 
from the top down and largely against the wishes of the academic community, in 
particular, against university professors whose positions deteriorated as a result of 
these reforms. It is worth recalling two extreme examples that help depict the social 
climate in which the reforms were implemented. 
Universities at that time, however, had not reckoned on the independent role 
of government. At the university of Nijmegen, the rector announced during 
a meeting that the consultation on university governance should be wound up 
before the deadline determined by the minister expired. Questioned whether 
the minister agreed, the rector answered (under applause) “this is for the 
minister to decide, but we are not so much concerned with this” (Janssen 
& Voestermans, 1984: 163). These and other anecdotes suggest that the 
university community excluded any governmental interference except as 
codifying what had been decided by the universities. (de Boer, Maassen, 
& de Weert 1999: 399)
Similar anecdotal stories that illustrate the former role of the government in higher 
education can also be found in other countries. For example, in Austria, a group of 
professors undertook a legal battle with the government and fought to the bitter 
end in order to prevent university reform efforts. But they failed to stop the process 
of modernization of university governance. 
Despite the lack of a common theoretical framework as to the process of 
implementation, the reforms in higher education shared a similar implementation 
context and goals (though various elements of the reform agenda received different 
priorities in different countries). It is significantly important to underscore that in 
all three countries, reforms of university governance were initiated by national 
governments. They were all consequences of growing political dissatisfaction with 
university performance and a lack of public accountability. Public discourse was 
dominated by hard criticism of higher education and the assumption that new 
times requires completely different or simply “modern universities.” Reforming 
universities held a variety of agendas, among which the most important were 
increasing the institutional autonomy of universities, increasing their social 
and political accountabilities, and most importantly, modernizing the university 
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governance model. This new approach also assumed that governments would be 
most effective if they remained at a distance in relation to university governance 
and that the new legislative framework should allow universities to be fairly 
autonomous. This policy model initially implemented in the Netherlands was named 
“steering at a distance” (de Boer, Leisyte, Enders 2006) and later spread to many 
continental European countries, including Austria and later on, Portugal. 
5.3. Major aspects of the university governance agenda 
In the last three decades, the reform agenda covered a wide range of different 
aspects, often very specific within national political and institutional contexts. 
Despite all these peculiarities, the reforms had a common core, governance. 
In all three reference countries, university governance became the central issue for 
higher education reforms. For the purpose of this study, we identify three aspects 
of governance — based on individual case studies — that we found most significant. 
These aspects were shared in the transformation of governance in the Netherlands, 
Austria, and Portugal. In no particular order, they are: (a) autonomy of universities, 
(b) the institutional structure and decision-making process, and (c) involvement of 
external stakeholders in running universities on various organizational levels. 
5.4. Autonomy of universities
One of the overarching trends in European higher education governance 
concerns the enhancement of institutional autonomy. Governments granted more 
institutional freedom because they believed this strategy would lead to increased 
effectiveness and efficiency, and universities would become more responsive to 
societal needs. University autonomy is a broad concept that involves a variety 
of different issues tailored to institutional and national contexts and conditions. 
In etymological terms, “autonomous” refers to the power to rule oneself. 
Applied to the university, it means the freedom to make decisions and subsequently 
to become independent vis-à-vis economic, political, or ideological external powers, 
(Prado 2009: 11–12). Overall, the extensive literature on university autonomy 
deals with theoretical disputes, and there are also a number of empirical studies. 
A number of attempts have been conducted aimed to conceptualize university 
autonomy. For the purpose of this study, we will select one, “The report on higher 
education reforms in Europe,” (volume 1: Governance) to distinguish the dimensions 
of autonomy: (a) organizational autonomy, (b) policy autonomy, (c) financial 
autonomy, and (d) interventional autonomy. This typology seems to be the most 
adequate theoretical framework for exploring the recent reforms of university 
governance in the three countries. 
One of the pillars of university governance reform is aimed at granting full 
legal autonomy by transforming universities into independent entities under 
public or (in Portugal) private law. If there is an aspect of autonomy that was 
chiefly strengthened, it was organizational autonomy — “the capacity of public 
universities to decide for themselves on their internal authority, responsibility and 
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accountability structure without any external interference” (Governance Reform 
Report 2009: 34). Notwithstanding supervision of the national government, 
universities (in general) were made easier to steer and gained capacities for 
action on the corporate level. By and large, the issue of organizational autonomy 
played a significant role in designing the overall content of reforms in all analyzed 
countries. “Freeing university” from unduly detailed and cumbersome state 
regulation was the leading idea behind strengthening university autonomy. 
Taking into account the changing social and economic conditions under which 
universities performed, governments decided to deregulate higher education 
and grant more autonomy for universities. This policy was based on the 
assumption that overregulated universities cannot take full advantage of their 
capacities. So far, only a few countries in Europe have implemented reforms 
that have seriously transferred power to the university, leaving it to universities 
to decide on their internal structure. Most countries kept some governmental 
regulations concerning internal governance structure. In all the reference 
countries, governments expanded university autonomy in determining individual 
institutional strategy, staff policy (with the exception of Portugal), and some 
aspects of salaries. Universities became more responsible for their performance, 
although the skeleton of governance structure and the decision-making process 
were determined by national legislation. Governments aspired to have their say 
on the main features of university structure, but at the same time, they did not 
want to interfere in the day-to-day business. By doing so, they allowed universities 
(Austria and the Netherlands) to change their legal status (this was optional for 
universities in Portugal). The aim was to move universities beyond the borders 
of the traditional public sector, where they had been subject to detailed state 
regulation. In other words, governments wanted to build the core organizational 
structure and set rules of internal governance. Simultaneously, they wanted to 
equip universities with a large amount of autonomy on an operational level in 
order to free them from their large bureaucratic burden. Traditionally, in all three 
countries, universities used to be an integral part of the public realm, where they 
were closely linked to the state’s administration. Being more loose from their public 
administrations, universities received more operational freedom in day-to-day 
business. In Austria, universities were transformed into independent entities under 
public law. In Portugal the amendment opens the possibility of independent legal 
status for public institutions, namely as public foundations governed by private 
law. In the Netherlands, universities turned into “public entrepreneurs, “managed 
professional public organizations (Hinings, Greenwood, & Cooper 1999), or just 
“more tightly coupled systems” (de Boer, Enders, & Leisyte 2007). However, 
they did not act as “really private corporations.” By expanding the organizational 
autonomy of universities, governments wanted to enable them to make the best 
possible use of their individual (intellectual and financial) resources, assuming 
that university management knows best in which direction its organization need 
to develop. Universities were largely freed from a number of public sector internal 
regulations (in particular related to funding) that constrained universities in 
their daily business. This opened a wide range of opportunities for institutional 
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profiling, both in teaching and research, and it also helped to absorb considerable 
amounts of resources through new contractual activities that helped to increase 
university budgets. It was warmly welcomed by governments (to a large extent 
in the Netherlands and Austria), as they had experienced serious cutbacks in 
higher education that left universities in an unfavorable situation. The government 
wanted universities to diversify their income sources and particularly to attract 
funding from the private sector because (at least in the Netherlands and Austria) 
there was a strong assumption that university funding was too dependent on the 
government’s budget. 
The second dimension of university autonomy is financial autonomy. It is generally 
defined as a key characteristic of autonomous organizations, comprised of 
a number of factors, among which is the freedom to decide on the internal 
allocation of funds, diversification of income sources (for example through tuition 
fees and other private contributions), building up reserves, and also borrowing 
funds on the capital market (2008: 11). Most governments implemented the 
financial autonomy of universities through formula-based, lump-sum budgeting 
that allows universities to decide the internal allocation of financial resources. 
The formulas were primarily for calculation purposes only, and the universities were 
free to use their resources according to their priorities. There is no doubt that in the 
last two decades all three research countries have implemented funding reforms 
that grant considerably more financial freedom to universities. This financial 
autonomy can be measured in a variety of different ways. We adopt (following the 
Governance Report) two key variables: level of autonomy and level of flexibility. 
The first refers to a multiple index based on four items: internal allocation of 
funds, borrowing funds on the capital market, building up reserves, and spending 
on operational grants. Austria and the Netherlands in 2008 were classified 
as countries of high-level financial autonomy. In particular, reforms in Austria 
expanded financial autonomy to universities because in 1995 it was still ranked 
as a country with universities of a low-level financial autonomy. The central 
governments expanded financial autonomy of universities, allowed them to take 
out loans, and provided them the right to earn their own income and create 
a financial surplus. Universities are funded by the federal government in the form 
of formula-based lump sum budgeting, which was split into two parts. The first 
part (80%) is based on contractual agreements, and the second (20%) is classic 
formula-based funding. A performance contract is concluded for a period of three 
years under public law. The funding is given on the basis of performance contracts. 
As Nickel and Affeld claim (2006: 9), contracts are negotiated between the 
ministry and the universities without uniform criteria for the calculation of funds. 
This is issue is twofold. On the one hand, such a method of funding provides some 
room for applying different practices to achieve given tasks within a fixed budget, 
though on the other hand, the autonomy of the university is limited to the criteria 
set in the contracts. There are eight fields of university performance that have 
been specified by the federal ministries responsible for higher education (where 
From “corporative university” to “corporate university”
contractual management is applicable). Within this framework, universities 
define their plans, targets, indicators, and time frames. The remaining 20 
percent of university budgets is funded through formula-based mechanisms, 
which are applied to three indicator groups: (a) teaching, (b) research, and (c) 
social goals. Another way of measuring financial autonomy is checking the level 
of financial flexibility, or the degree to which the university enjoys grant flexibility 
to cover different categories of expenditures. All three countries report a high 
level of flexibility, which translates into freedom to use grant money for whatever 
purposes is needed. As in the previous case, Austria has experienced the biggest 
increase in flexibility, considering that Austrian universities were classified as 
having low-level flexibility in 1995 and high-level flexibility in 2008. In other words, 
governments’ focus shifted from input to output control, delegating responsibility 
for the way money is spent on university managements’ shoulders. It translates into 
a great diversity of internal models for fund allocation, ranging from sophisticated 
performance-based approaches to more traditional methods of funding. In all, the 
research country universities received more financial autonomy and managerial 
freedom to link resources to institutional strategy. Governance reforms are 
regarded as positive or even “a blessing for higher education,” but to be fair, the 
positive outcomes are also a result of large investments in the past. 
The third dimension of autonomy is policy autonomy, which refers to the ability 
of public universities to constitute their own academic community in terms 
of student and staff selection and to determine their teaching and research 
programs. In regards to student selection, universities in the Netherlands, 
Austria, and Portugal have some limitations in comparison to the Polish public 
universities. Austria and the Netherlands have low autonomy as it relates to 
selecting the number of study places. For the purpose of this study, an important 
issue is autonomy as it relates to staff selection and setting salaries. The reforms 
introduced in the last decades deregulated staffing matters to a large extent. 
Universities are free to appoint academic staff members, determine their job 
descriptions, and set their salary levels. And in this respect, universities in the 
Netherlands and Austria enjoy the highest degree of autonomy, while in Portugal 
they have very limited space to manoeuver on staffing matters. In the reform 
countries, this shift in autonomy was significant, and university management was 
quite pleased with these developments, although deregulation implied worsening 
employment conditions for academics who saw their salary become more related 
to performance. Another aspect of policy autonomy is the ability to determine 
teaching and research programs.
The last aspect of autonomy is so called “interventional autonomy,” defined as 
the extent to which organizations are free from ex post accountability requirements 
(Verhoest et al. 2004). Overall, European universities have experienced a growing 
demand for reporting about various aspects of their activities. Making comparisons 
between countries is a difficult task, but in the case of The Governance Report, 
the research team developed an index based on six items: obligations to develop 
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strategic plans, reporting requirements, and to establish external and internal 
evaluation schemes for teaching and research. Based on this index, Portugal 
and Austria enjoy a high level of autonomy, while universities in the Netherlands 
have a medium level of autonomy. The last decade is characterized by a growing 
demand for reporting on various aspects of university activity. The philosophy of 
steering at a distance requires extensive reporting on various aspects of university 
performance. This applies mainly to research performance, which has become 
intensively measured and assessed by a wide range of bibliometric instruments. 
These reports create room for collecting data for both internal and external 
purposes. 
Summing up, there has definitely been a change in defining the autonomy of 
universities. In general, universities received bigger institutional autonomy, 
in particular, in terms of organizational, financial, and policy (related to staff) 
dimensions, while the interventional autonomy has largely decreased. Among the 
three research countries, Austria and the Netherlands strongly comply with this 
trend, while autonomy of Portuguese universities has not changed that much, 
despite the reforms. It appears that the direction of change in Portugal is similar to 
other countries, but because the reforms were launched much later, the process is 
less advanced. 
5.4.1. Autonomy in staff policy
Autonomy in university staff policy has significantly changed, with countries making 
significant steps toward deregulation of this aspect of university governance. 
In each of three analyzed countries, the reforms aimed at lifting (at least) some 
regulation, leaving the university freed to make decisions regarding staff issues. 
It was important due to fact that higher education in Europe has deep roots in 
the public sector and also shares a number of characteristics with government, 
including stable employment conditions. Going beyond the past legacy was quite 
a challenge because universities continued to remain under public law (with an 
exception of some institutions in Portugal) and within the public realm. But in all the 
studied cases, they wanted to establish their own policy in terms of recruitment, 
types of positions, employment conditions for different categories of employees, 
levels of salaries, etc. The reforms wanted to modernize employment relations and 
delegate as much power as possible to the university level. There is little doubt 
that all the countries shared a similar direction, although the outcomes were 
considerably different. Autonomy in staffing can be analyzed in four major aspects:
(a) establishing salary scale;
(b) determining the individual basic annual gross salary;
(c) determining bonuses and additional increments;
(d) defining promotion criteria. 
Complete autonomy in all four aspects of staff policy has not been achieved in 
any of the three researched countries, but the reforms unquestionably aimed at 
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expanding institutional capacity to determine human resource developments. 
According to the matrix established by Eurydice (2008), the most liberal measures 
to decentralize staff issues have been undertaken in Austrian universities, in which 
only determining the individual basic annual gross salary is set on the national level. 
Less decentralized policy was introduced in the Netherlands, where determining the 
individual basic annual gross salary and setting the “salary scale” are determined 
on the national level. In both countries, academics have lost status as “public 
servants,” and their employment contracts have been renegotiated under private 
law. In contrast, Portuguese universities, which opted to stay under the public law, 
remain as public sector organizations with the rules set on the national level. 
5.4.2. Autonomy in research and teaching 
The last distinguished aspect of university autonomy refers to the capacity of public 
universities to control their teaching programs and research profile. In all three 
countries, there has been quite a radical move toward expansion of institutional 
freedom in profiling and choosing the most appropriate way to achieve excellence 
in research and teaching. Strong state regulations have become the subject of 
massive ideological critiques, and instead of top-down regulations of university 
performance, states have more of a “supervisory role,” which allows them to play 
an influential but indirect role Most countries have swapped the traditional state 
control to a more “steering at a distance” model by setting the objectives (ideally 
with cooperation from the university) or matching objectives with the level of 
public funding. This trend — initially accepted with some resistance from academic 
community — led to the horizontal and vertical diversification of higher education 
institutions. It applies to research and teaching aspects of university performance. 
As a result, universities have become more autonomous in building their research 
and teaching profile. 
In Portugal, the state tries to disseminate information in order to correct for 
information asymmetry between service providers and users. It publishes 
documents and standardizes indicators in order to equip secondary schools 
graduates with information to help them make the right choices as to their future 
careers. Autonomy is particularly relevant in the Portuguese situation, which has 
shifted from a supply-side to a demand-driven market due to a low fertility rate and 
a falling number of traditional students. As a result, more higher vocational courses 
that provided degrees directly relevant for the labor market were established. 
The reforms involved founding external quality agencies responsible for education 
in the Netherlands (QANU - Quality Assurance Netherlands Universities), in Austria 
(AQA - Austrian Agency for Quality Assurance) and in Portugal (A3ES - Agency 
for Evaluation and Accreditation of Higher Education). The role of the agencies 
is to provide independent quality assessment and accreditation of higher 
education institutions and their performance. There are two major reasons behind 
transferring the authority of evaluation and accreditation of higher education 
institutions to external quality agencies: the first is a liberal u-turn in public policy 
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to roll back the frontiers of the state. Proponents want the government to stay 
away from the detailed issues of service delivery and focus on the outcomes. 
Secondly, the Bologna Declaration signed by European leaders required education 
programs to be defined through comparable learning outcomes. As one can 
imagine, the idea of external evaluation did not receive applause from the academic 
community. To the contrary, the development of evaluation and accreditation 
schemes was seen as a fashion trend. It was not appreciated as an opportunity 
for universities to profile themselves and develop new education programs. 
The biggest controversy was sparked in Portugal, when the process of reforms 
was initially (after a long and painful saga) named a “from learning to walk to 
dysfunctional teenager,”(Rosa & Sarrico 2012: 251-257) leaving some hopes that 
one day it would grow and become mature and responsible for its actions. It is 
difficult to compare the outcomes of reforms in all three countries because they 
are at different stages of implementation, but there are some signals from the 
evaluations of reforms (Netherlands) and estimations by experts (Portugal and 
Austria). In the Netherlands, the external accreditation mechanisms seem to be the 
most developed. In all three countries, internal mechanisms of quality assurance 
have undoubtedly been strengthened. With the experience of approximately 
a decade to draw on, there is little doubt about improvements in accountability 
and quality of teaching. In a highly competitive environment, universities have 
become more accountable through better and more reliable information about 
their performance. The governments have addressed market failure and reduced 
information asymmetry. It is no less important that the reforms generally led to 
improvements in the quality of accredited degree programs, but they also improved 
the higher education system as a whole. Rosa and Saricco (2011: 261) summarize 
the consequence for Portuguese universities, but this conclusion could be expanded 
to include Dutch and Austrian higher education institutions: “Given massification in 
Portuguese higher education, what is relevant to the graduate labor market is less 
the possession of a degree, than the perceived quality of that degree.”
The competitive mechanisms were deployed, but the university sector is different 
than the private sector. Academic competition is based on academic judgments, 
peer review, and the generally strong involvement of other actors (competitors) on 
the supply side. It does not make overall competition less fierce, since it is shaped by 
the race for scarce resources, such as money and prestige. In regards to research, 
the impact of delegating more autonomy on the institutional level could be more 
difficult to estimate since there were other parallel processes in action at the same 
time. It remains clear that Dutch universities took full advantage of autonomy and 
managed to increase their institutional capacity by building their individual research 
and teaching profiles. The growing diversity of education programs provides better 
opportunity for graduates and makes the universities more flexible in terms of 
building their educational and research programs that they offer to the private 
sector. It also helped them to attract third-party funding. For Dutch universities, the 
contracted activities made up almost 30 percent of their institutional income.
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5.5. Governance structure 
Ideas about the organization and governance of universities have changed over the 
last few decades. Reforms of university governance have deeply revolutionized the 
patterns of institutional management. By and large, most European countries have 
gone through similar stages, although reforms were often launched in different 
timeframes (Neave 1992: 84–127). Our research shows that the three research 
countries reveal no difference.
Analysis of the developments in higher education in Europe after WW II allows us 
to distinguish three major models of internal university decision-making structures. 
The three types of universities are: (a) the corporative university, (b) the democratic 
university, and (c) the managerial university. The literature review shows that 
there is a changing pattern of institutional management that has been reflected 
in most European countries. European universities have undergone fundamental 
transformation from corporative organizations of senior professors to democratic 
institutions that were “loosely coupled” to “tightly coupled” systems based on 
a managerialist canon that encompasses strong institutional leadership. 
Despite the fact this study covers developments in higher education in 
approximately the last two decades, it is worthwhile to quickly examine the overall 
process of transformation of institutional governance of universities in Europe. 
The first phase of institutional management was the “corporative university,” with 
dominating roles for professors, who effectively ran the universities. This model 
of university is called a republic of scholars, in which both leadership and decision 
making are based on collegial decisions made by independent professors. 
But universities have traditionally been public institutions that were steered, 
controlled, administrated, and funded by the state (or on its behalf). It was an 
integral part of academic tradition in both Austria and the Netherlands, although in 
Austria, the organization of universities resembled the Humboldtian model, while 
the Netherlands was inspired by the Napoleonic model. In Portugal, the dictatorial 
regime added some autocratic elements to higher education institutions, such as 
appointments of rectors and faculty heads by ministerial orders (Lima 2011: 288). 
Nevertheless, we can conclude that all of the models of institutional arrangements 
were characterized by far-reaching decision-making powers for the state in all 
academic matters and also close and strong ties with the state. It was an example 
of professional self-regulation, under which academics ran their own teaching and 
research operations. But almost all nonacademic and organizational aspects of 
university life fell to the discretion of the state. The governments were responsible 
for budgeting, organizational structure, and staff. This mixture of collegiality and 
bureaucracy was called “duplex ordo” by de Boer; these parallel power structures 
were a major source of tensions at universities. 
The second phase of transformation of the university took off around the 1970s 
and 1980s and caused democratization of the university. Democratization of 
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the university was linked to enhancing democracy in society at large (Habermas 
1967; de Boer, Massen & de Weert 1999). In the Western World, the 1970s are 
generally regarded as the heyday of academic democracy, and many countries 
(including the Netherlands in the 1970s , and Austria and Portugal in the 1980s) 
were being democratized. The notion of democracy carries different meanings 
to different people, but in the case of the university, it translates into (more) 
equal representation of students, junior academics, and nonacademic staff in 
collegial bodies next to the senior academics (professors) and obviously their 
participation in running the university. Having said that, it must be underlined that 
internal and external autonomy are justified by reference to a mix of principles 
and concerns (Maassen and Olsen 2007). Referring to Austrian reforms, Pechar 
claims that the reforms were underpinned by values that reflected the spirit of 
the times: “openness” and “democratization” of higher education (Pechar 2005a: 
1). This applied to the increase of student and junior academic participation in 
the decision-making process and their growing role in university governance 
structure (Pechar 2005b: 4-5). Rosemary Deem (1998: 48) defines the system 
as “the collegiality of academics of equal status working together with minimal 
hierarchy and maximum trust, and the rather “hands-off” but also gentle governance 
practices.” This democratic shift reflected the spirit of the times. The university 
as a democratic institution relied on collegial bodies composed of various internal 
stakeholders. The students revolts began the process of democratization of 
universities, aiming to increase the participation of various internal stakeholders 
in university governance. The university as a democratic institution was very much 
a political institution, with a prime focus on wide participation in the process of 
university governance. Running a university was dominated by a continuous search 
for compromises in order to win a majority (often shaky). It made the decision-
making process cumbersome and extremely ineffective, and to add insult to injury, 
the managerial system was designed to primarily satisfy the demands of various 
interest groups within the organization. This model of institutional management of 
democratic universities was more oriented on process and participation (inclusion of 
different actors) than on performance and outcomes. It was built on the principles of 
collegiality.
 
In this [collegial] world governance is the prerogative of the gifted amateurs, 
who occasionally may need to call upon their officials (or outside advisors) 
for technical and professional advice. Almost by definition, college business 
proceeds at a steady, even humdrum, pace: eschewing both leadership and 
managerialism but dominated by the routines of committees and open to the 
delaying tactics of the obdurate individual or clique. Tapper (1998: 145) 
Therefore, it reflected a traditional public sector philosophy. In all three countries, 
democratization of university management made an important imprint on its legacy 
but did not really fit the new philosophy of “steering from a distance,” which wanted 
universities to be more responsive. All three research countries have experienced 
the process of democratization of the university, and there were striking similarities 
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in logic (and principles) and only minor differences between countries. The most 
radical form of democracy at universities was reported in Portugal. It was clearly 
a revolutionary response to the regime of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and an 
extreme model of the “corporative university” was replaced by another extreme 
model, the “democratic university.” 
This moment of self management, combining the revolutionary practices 
of radical democracy with direct participation, transformed universities 
into political arenas, ideological battlefields, or places of conflicts. 
(Lima 2011: 289)
In the third phase, new ideas about university management have altered the 
political rhetoric and discourse about issues concerning higher education 
(Neave 1998, 2002). George Krucken (2011) observes that the traditional forms 
of university governance have come under strong political and economic pressure. 
The capacity of governance by the academic community lost its political legitimacy 
and public confidence. Both the corporative and democratic model of universities 
were perceived as a community of scholars (although with different notions of 
scholars), researchers, and teachers running universities in a collegial way. 
The third phase is linked to a much broader transformation of the public sector 
by transferring private sector managerial techniques into the public sector and 
voluntary organizations (Reed and Anthony 1993, Clarke et al. 1994, Clark 
& Newman 1994, 1997b). It also aimed to attempt to inject private sector values, 
managerial regimes, and organizational culture into the public realm. Clark and 
Newman (1997a) claim that “new managerialism” can be detected in the forms 
of organizations, their cultures, and also in their managerial narratives and 
techniques. The managerial revolution in higher education stormed through most 
of the European countries, but de Boer (2003: 92) also observed some national or 
regional specificities in responding to this ideological shift in higher education; but 
the general logic of the new institutional managerial order remained similar. 
The principle of “new managerialism” tried to transform the democratic university 
into an entrepreneurial one, which in all of the countries involved a transfer of 
power from collegial bodies to the individual positions of university managers 
at a different level. Collegial bodies were stripped from managerial power and 
redesigned into more advisory boards with little to say besides giving advice. 
This power transfer suggests new institutional arrangements with a distinct 
private sector vertical management structure. In this respect, it is worthwhile 
to acknowledge that the Dutch government also introduced the toppling model 
of appointing managerial positions within universities. At the top of the 
university power structure stands the rector, who is accountable to some form 
of supervisory board functioning under different names in different countries. 
This form of accountability comes from the fact that rectors are appointed/
dismissed (not elected as in the democratic model or appointed by the government) 
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by supervisory boards (or university councils) that are comprised of a mixture of 
internal representatives and more powerful external stakeholders. By and large, 
supervisory boards played a key role in a new management structure; their role is 
evaluated in a separate section.
With the spirit of the private sector, a strong focus on measuring almost every 
aspect of university performance also came along. It covered institutional, 
departmental, unit, and individual levels of performance. Ultimately, it became 
a powerful managerial tool in pursuing organizational goals and also (some would 
claim, primarily) effectiveness, efficiency, and economy of university performance. 
This was a significant step toward evidence-based management, which is built on 
solid quantified data. However, some critics would rightly acknowledge that not 
everything that counts is measurable, and not everything that is measurable counts.
Finally, another aspect of the managerial canon that has been introduced relates to 
the modernization of employment relations. Although conditions of employment 
show some distinct national peculiarities due to various academic traditions, 
there has been a strong trend toward more flexible and less secure employment. 
Each of the researched countries have exercised power in a distinct way in this 
regard, either by delegating almost all the power regarding staff issues to individual 
universities or by simply employing staff under private law contracts, which implies 
a high degree of flexibility but also insecurity in employment terms. 
It needs to be underscored that the introduction of managerial approaches was 
not a smooth ride in any of the reference countries. To the contrary, it was a rather 
difficult, painful, and controversial process in which universities and academics 
struggled with their newly gained freedom (de Boer and Goedegebuure 2007: 48). 
5.6. The increase of a number of actors involved in university 
governance 
The last aspect of transforming university governance was the increase of the 
role of external stakeholders involved in the university governance. In all the 
research countries, a significant change in public policy aimed to increase public 
accountability of universities and establish an effective balance between academic 
excellence and socio-economic relevance. Simply, national governments want to 
see more direct interactions between universities and society, which is at odds with 
the traditional notion of the university as an elite institution, independent from 
outside demands. This policy shift was unavoidable due to the fact that universities 
were required to produce knowledge of relevance to society at large and also to 
deliver graduates that would be able to fuel the development of the post-industrial 
economy. 
The involvement of external stakeholders in university governance was 
institutionalized in the form of supervisory boards or boards of trustees. 
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This relatively simple innovation meant significant change for universities mainly 
because the executive management of universities has become accountable to 
supervisory bodies comprised of external stakeholders. This is a revolutionary 
change compared to a democratic university, which encompassed internal 
accountability because academics (mostly university professors) and students 
elected the rector. This change has generated far-reaching consequences. 
Accountability is generally defined as “the obligation to report to others, to explain, 
to justify, to answer questions about how resources have been used and to what 
effect” (Trow 1996: 310).
Romzek (2000), who offers the most comprehensive method for analyzing types 
of accountability relations, identifies four types of accountability: hierarchical, 
legal, professional, and political. The three countries have shown a swing from 
professional to political accountability in universities. Romzek (2000: 26) claims, 
“Professional accountability systems are reflected in work arrangements that 
afford high degrees of autonomy to individuals who base their decision-making on 
internalized norms of appropriate practice.” And Huisman and Currie (2004:531) 
add to this way of thinking that political accountability provides university managers 
“the discretion or choice to be responsive to the concerns of key interest groups, 
such as elected officials, clientele groups, and the general public.” 
From an institutional point of view, universities in all three research countries were 
equipped with external bodies. It was a radical change and a new phenomenon 
because supervisory boards (as boards of curators) had previously existed only 
in the Netherlands. The growing influence and increasing numbers of various 
(external) actors involved in university governance has made the university 
governance structure more complex than it was in early 1980s, when Clark (1983) 
described three modes of university coordination. This complexity stems from the 
fact that the modern university has more functions to perform than in the past 
because it has become an integral part of the post-industrial economy and society. 
Universities are confronted with a number of (sometimes conflicting) internal 
and external expectations concerning their economic relevance and academic 
excellence. It has made university governance complex and political accountability 
extremely hard to handle. By involving representatives of external stakeholders in 
supervisory boards, universities are meant to be more responsive to the needs of 
society. Different countries have applied different regulations and compositions to 
external supervisory bodies, but they all share some distinctive features that need 
further examination. 
First and foremost, their major role is to elect/appoint rectors/presidents (and other 
executive university manager positions) and supervise their performance. 
The composition of supervisory boards is different in each of the examined 
countries. The most external in terms of composition of these bodies is found 
in the Dutch universities, where all five members of supervisory boards are 
appointed by the minister, and they are all external to the university. In Austrian 
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universities, supervisory boards (called university councils) demonstrate perfect 
balance between external and internal representatives. University councils are 
comprised of equal representatives nominated by the minister and the university 
senate. Austrian university councils are comprised of an odd number of members 
(five, seven, or nine) with one seat selected by the already appointed members. 
In Portuguese universities, the general councils are the biggest (15 to 35 members) 
among the research countries, and they have the most “internal” composition 
as well as the most democratic way of appointing (in fact electing) members. 
Only between 30 percent and 49 percent of members of university councils 
are individuals of recognized merit with knowledge and experience (who do 
not otherwise belong to the institution), while the majority of members on the 
councils are academics and students. In short, Dutch universities reveal the most 
advanced and Portuguese the least advanced stage of transferring accountability 
from professionals to political actors. The Austrian universities keep the perfect 
balance between externally and internally appointed representatives. Second, these 
supervisory boards are complementary elements of university governance 
structure, and their members have a duty to perform. The implementation of 
supervisory bodies resulted in the transformation of public policy based on the 
indirect influence of a wide range of various external stakeholders. Supervisory 
bodies are serious units that have dedicated tasks to perform in every country, 
even if they meet only four times a year. Differences in composition between the 
countries reflect different academic traditions (Napoleonic, and Humboldtian) and 
distinct political legacies. Thirdly, in all three countries, supervisory bodies perform 
strategic functions. The list of tasks covers such important roles as appointing/
dismissing the rector/president, organizing the election procedures, and approving 
changes in university status. In Austria and the Netherlands, where universities are 
much more politically accountable, supervisory bodies are also responsible for more 
strategic issues, such as approving strategic plans, financial plans, and budgets. 
To sum up, it must be acknowledged that in all three countries, university 
governance played a central role and became a central goal of the reform agenda. 
All societies have specific characteristics that affect the dynamics of socio-
economic changes. Despite some national peculiarities stemming from different 
political circumstances and different academic traditions, the reforms of university 
governance aimed to handle three main shared issues: (a) the autonomy of 
universities, (b) governance structure, and (c) involvement of external stakeholders 
in running universities. Although, institutional settings may naturally reveal some 
national characteristics that vary from country to country, the contents of reform 
agendas reveal major similarities.
6. Reforms in Portugal, the 
Netherlands, and Austria in 
the context of problems with 
university governance in Poland 
Our interviews with Polish experts present a great variety of different opinions 
and views towards university governance. But the aim was not to investigate the 
personal views of selected individuals but instead to refer to their managerial 
experience and knowledge about university governance in Poland. We use them 
as a sounding board and as experts, not as representative sample of the academic 
community or of rectors (or former rectors). Therefore, this research strategy does 
not allow us to formulate strong conclusions as to the overall academic community 
in Poland. Instead, as the research aims state, we want to investigate:
(a) if the university governance reforms in Austria, the Netherlands and Portugal 
can be used as a source of inspiration, roadmap, or simply as a toolkit for Polish 
reform efforts;
(b) whether new institutional arrangements can effectively address problems of 
universities in Poland; 
(c) how these political and institutional reforms would be accepted by the 
academic community in Poland. 
The experts (listed in the attachment) were selected as a purposive sample. They 
are all individuals with significant managerial experience in running universities 
or bodies in the higher education system of Poland. The list covers present 
and previous rectors, vice-rectors, and deputy ministers responsible for higher 
education. The key criteria for selection was extensive managerial experience 
in higher education; the interviewees were expected to make strong reference 
to their managerial experience, while elaborating on transferring innovative 
policy and institutional arrangements to universities in Poland. The qualitative 
analysis precludes a quantitative conclusion, although the aim of the research is 
to investigate how the reforms (the aspects selected in chapter five) can address 
problems in Polish universities. Our ambition was to test various reform issues 
against the experience of the experts in order to come up with useful propositions 
for reform of university governance in Poland. Experts were asked to reflect upon 
major issues that emerged from the desk research and to identify issues that 
could help Polish universities improve their performance and also what would be 
feasible for implementation. By doing so, we want to inform the public debate on 
modernization in Polish higher education since it is dominated by a type of thinking 
that is often called strong conviction and little evidence.
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6.1. Existing documents 
A starting point of our analysis is a brief look at two rival strategic documents 
under the same title, “Strategy of Higher Education Development in Poland until 
2020,” which were prepared by two competitive “camps”: (1) a group of rectors 
under the institutional umbrella of KRASP and the Foundation of Polish Rectors 
(FRP) and (2) an external consortium comprised of Ernst & Young and IBnGR. 
There is not a significant difference between the two documents in regards to 
university governance, but they differ in terms of the level of analysis. The first 
document refers to blue sky ideas and only signals issues that need to be considered 
in reforming the university sector. It sheds light on directions of future possible 
developments. Below are two quotes from the first document that refer to university 
governance but also illustrate the level of analysis. 
The governance of public universities will be based on harmonization, in the 
new framework the rector will have greater managerial power, which covers 
governing functions in the area of education, research and social mission 
of the university; and also managerial functions in regards to resources. 
Universities in their statutes can split supervisory power between senates 
and new external bodies — the board of trustees. The board of trustee will 
take over the competences of the Ministry of Finance in relation to university 
resource management. (KRASP 2009a:67)
The scope of power and responsibilities of internal authorities (senate, rector, 
deans etc.) will be re-defined and possibly also the way they are elected/
selected. On top of it, more effective systems of quality management will be 
introduced in key areas of university performance. (KRASP 2009a: 67)
The strategy of KRASP was to point out the direction of changes, paying little 
attention to details on the institutional level. And the devil is always in the detail. 
By and large, this strategy strengthened the position of rectors, giving them more 
organizational power, but it also reserves room for external bodies such as boards of 
trustees.
The IBnGR and E&Y strategy, on the contrary, provides a concrete model of 
university governance, which can be called an “entrepreneurial university 
model.” It was aimed to be more accountable, quality oriented, and transparent. 
The structure of university governance was comprised of the following authorities: 
(a) the board of trustees;
(b) collegiums of rectors;
(c) the academic senate;
(d) the employee’s council;
(e) the students’ council (which also included doctoral students). 
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The novelty is that the board of trustees is comprised of seven members: one 
representative appointed by the ministry, two by the university senate, two by 
local authorities, and two by an organization of employers. The board of trustees 
is responsible for selection of the rector by appointing a special committee in 
which current university employees cannot have a majority. The committee 
conducts hearings and presents a ranking of candidates to the board with its 
recommendations, though the board of trustees appoints the rector.
Comparing these two documents, one can say that both documents refer directly to 
university governance and reflect on similar positions as to the direction of reforms. 
It is a surprise if we take into account that the relation between the two camps was 
rather hostile. The difference between the two documents is the level of analysis. 
The KRASP strategy sets a direction of change, while IBnGR and E&Y also offer 
a roadmap and detailed institutional arrangements. In a way, these two strategies 
were incomparable due to the gap between the different levels of analysis and 
conclusions. This incompatibility of the two documents might be partly blamed for 
the discussion drifting away from the essence. The public discourse that followed 
the publication of the documents revealed great dissatisfaction or disapproval 
of the conviction that private enterprises were to be made more responsible for 
providing strategic direction for higher education in Poland. Many prominent 
members of the academic oligarchy expressed their disappointment with the fact 
that it was E&Y and IBnGR who won a competitive tendering for preparing the 
strategic document for higher education development through 2020. By doing so, 
they tend to focus on organizations while the team deployed to draft the report 
comprised of well respected academics with academic knowledge (and rich list of 
publication) and managerial experience in higher education.
Instead of paying attention to the content of these strategies, most prominent 
members of the academic community focused on two facts: (a) the amount of 
money that had been paid for this strategic document (350k euros) and (b) that it 
was paid to a private consulting enterprise (in fact a consortium). The Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education, which was responsible for outsourcing this strategic 
document, was largely blamed for wasting public funding, supporting private 
consulting firms, and disrespecting academia. This criticism was not only expressed 
by the academic oligarchy, which traditionally has an uneasy relation with liberal 
government, but also by a number of representatives of the academic community.
 
The discussion that followed the publication of the two documents named “Strategy 
of Development of Polish Higher Education to 2020” illustrates a meaningful 
introduction to the analysis of experts’ interviews in university governance reforms 
in Poland. For almost 20 years, the governments in Poland applied a policy of status 
quo, or “non-policy” with regard to higher education. The ministry responsible 
for science and higher education has been traditionally weak as a political actor 
and has performed mostly administrative tasks. The reform of the Law of Higher 
Education in 2005 was prepared by a group of rectors affiliated with former 
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president Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who led this project through the Parliament. 
After 20 years of the policy of non-policy, it should be no surprise that the academic 
community did not accept external actors (in particular from the private sector) 
to become involved in higher education policy-making. Higher education policy is 
generally expected to be made by representatives of the academic community or 
at least the Academy of Science. Higher education and science are generally seen 
as internal issues of the academic community, which should remain in the hands of 
academics.
6.2. The Law of Higher Education in Poland
The amendment of the Law of Higher Education (LHE) passed the Parliament 
in 2010. The green paper was very ambitious, although during the process 
of consultation with the academic community, it was stripped from its most 
adventurous propositions. It lost its sharpness in regards to the modernization 
of university governance, which in the end provided only for insignificant and 
peripheral changes. The final document that passed the Parliament includes the 
following novelties in regards to university governance: 
(a) Allowing universities to establish external institutional bodies — convents. 
Their power is purely symbolic;
(b) Allowing universities to select the rector and deans through an open-call 
system; 
(c) Abolishing the upper limits of academic salaries; 
(d) Strengthening the position of the rector at the expense of the university senate;
(e) Introducing obligatory layoff procedures for academics who receive two 
consecutive negative assessments;
(f) Requiring approval from the rector for second (full-time) employment (until 
then, only third full-time employment had required approval from the rector); 
(g) Providing the ministry with the right to suspend rectors and other institutional 
authorities and delegates for a maximum of three years, in cases where the 
financial situation of their institution is in a critical state. 
(h) Putting a 2% cap on enrolment in full-time programs in public HEI
The new Law of Higher Education sets a clear direction for reforms, although the 
reforms of 2010 had a more symbolic meaning than any real impact on university 
governance. The ministry wanted to make universities more entrepreneurial, 
but the most important changes are optional, and it is up to university senates 
whether they are introduced. It is no surprise that most of the universities rejected 
entrepreneurial reforms of university governance and kept to their democratic 
model. As is mentioned above, the ministry initially had great and ambitious plans 
to incorporate deeper changes but failed due to resistance from the academic 
community (or its prominent representatives). The result was that there was 
no single university that decided to elect/select university managerial positions 
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through open calls in 2012. What is more, some universities totally ruled out this 
possibility from their statutes. And only a few academic institutions decided to 
establish university convents, although without any managerial power. They serve 
mostly decorative functions as a meeting forum for various external stakeholders.
 
The reforms of 2010 made two important, hard, and unconditional changes to the 
Law of Higher Education that had a direct impact on university governance and 
management. First, it made the rector more (managerial) individually responsible 
for the university’s well-being. She or he received more managerial instruments, but 
the reforms also put more responsibility on the rector. The new law builds a solid 
foundation for institutional leadership. But the real (mental) shift was associated 
with allowing the ministry to suspend the rector, senate, and boards of departments 
(in regards to managerial issues) if the university loses financial stability and 
fails to provide an austerity plan. This is clearly a hypothetical scenario because 
conditions under which such radical steps could be undertaken are restrictive. 
But it aims to remind the academic community that financial stability of universities 
should be taken seriously into account, and universities cannot spend more than 
they have. At the end of the day, this is public money and public debt is at stake. 
Nevertheless, the announcement of the amendment (in particular the possibility 
of suspending a democratically elected rector) caused a public outcry, fueled by 
academic oligarchs who entirely disagreed with the ministry. The debate became 
very emotional; some of the rectors openly recalled the time of Stalinism, when the 
ministry also had power to suspend rectors (although the rationale behind it was 
different). The chairwoman of KRASP and the rector of The University of Warsaw 
responded in the following words: “Entering of rector-commissar to university 
means the end of university autonomy” (Rzeczpospolita). Jerzy Woźnicki, the 
president of the Polish Rectors Foundation, also reacted in similar way, warning 
the ministry that “this mechanism is associated the heritage of PRL, and rector-
commissar means assassination of independence of higher education institutions 
(…) because rector-commissar suspends university rector, senate and boards of 
departments.” Public debate was dominated by emotional arguments and big 
ideas. But in fact, it was the clash between the public authority (the ministry) and 
the academic oligarchy (rector organizations) over the balance of power in higher 
education in Poland. More than anything else, this dispute was about a power 
struggle over public policy in higher education, which also covered the authority 
to determine the model of university governance. For years it was the academic 
community who had the final say, but this government had a clearly different 
agenda. But the struggle is not over yet, and the question still remains open as 
to who has the authority to decide about public policy, the academic community 
or the public authority. This question is highly relevant to our research and its 
aspiration to influence public policy with respect to university governance. One may 
say, that these recent amendments failed to introduce deep structural changes of 
university governance in Poland. It is not far from the truth, but only a part of the 
story. Considering Polish higher education policy in the last two decades, recent 
amendments to the law of higher education made a significant contribution to 
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the overall understanding of public policy in this area. It was a real political u-turn. 
Despite the rather modest changes of university governance, the ministry wanted to 
be seen more as an active political actor and policy maker than as an administrator. 
It tried to impose in public policy the meaning of old English proverb “who pays the 
piper calls the tune” but faced strong resistance from the academic community that 
for two decades has seen public policy being made the other way around.
To sum up, for two decades Polish governments have conducted a policy of non-
policy, leaving room for the academic oligarchy to run the business. It is a tough 
challenge to turn from this path. The public debate over “Higher Education strategy 
to 2020” and the amendments to the law of higher education in 2010 left little 
doubt that there is an uneasy relation between the ministry and the academic 
oligarchy; the latter does not welcome external stakeholders to be engaged in 
higher education policy, neither as stakeholders nor as experts.
6.3. What kind of university for what kind of society?
This fundamental question is the best possible introduction to a discussion about 
a new model of university governance in Poland. The idea of recent reforms in 
Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal was to transform universities into more 
entrepreneurial organizations. This was a consequence of a failing welfare state that 
could no longer sustain its financial commitments to further expansion of higher 
education and the research sector. Also, universities were seen as unable to live up 
to the expectations that society had. There was a great deal of dissatisfaction about 
university performance. In particular, the post-industrial model of economy opened 
a wide range of opportunities for providing contract-based services to private and 
public sector organizations in the area of education, research, and consultancy. 
It is worth noting that during the interviews, all the experts share their views on the 
university expressing the classic approach applied by Maassen and Olsen who see 
university:
(…) as an institution which is a relatively enduring collection of rules and 
organized practices, embedded in structure of meaning and resources that are 
relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient 
to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing 
external circumstances. (2007: 27)
They underline that well-rooted institutions “reflect the historical experience of 
a community, that take time to root and are difficult to change rapidly and radically, 
except under special circumstances such as widely agreed-upon performance crises” 
(ibidem). This point of view was very familiar to the experts, who often refer to 
Polish history and academic tradition regardless of their opinions on current issues. 
They also claim that this line of thinking about the university reflects the mood of 
the academic community in Poland. 
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The experts were sharply and fundamentally split over the definition of the 
university. Despite their point of view, they admit that universities in Poland are 
predominantly seen as political actors in which the internal balance of power is 
a key aspect of institutional governance. In addition, universities are established 
to provide and secure freedom for individual academics, who require it to be 
creative. So, the central value of the university is freedom, which is the foundation 
of any creative type of performance. As one interviewee underlined, “The most 
important thing at the university is guarantees of freedom.” Freedom of research 
and teaching lie at the center of the university and can be only protected by the 
university community. So, as one of the experts declared, “It automatically provides 
the answer [to the question] about university self-governance. Must be (…) even 
if it limits university steering capacity. Self-governance of university community 
guarantees academic freedom.” Naturally, this point of departure implies that the 
democratic governance model is the one and only governance mode for academic 
institutions. This expert provides an exhaustive explanation:
 
We protect academic freedom through two mechanisms: personal and 
normative: personal tenure – life position for privilege few, selected, 
outstanding academics (not for all and not too early); normative – institutional 
rules that provide guarantee of academic freedom, and the rules must be 
provided (guaranteed) by self-governing bodies that represent university 
community. These self-governing bodies are comprised of various 
representatives of university community that are necessary to prevent 
institutional anarchy. In short, collegial and democratic bodies are integral 
parts of university.
This very conservative opinion expressed by one of the key experts is not an isolated 
phenomenon. Although it is difficult to provide solid evidence as to its popularity, 
the analysis of the discourse over competing strategies of Polish Higher Education 
to 2020 and recent amendments to the law of higher education provides some 
evidence that allows us to assume that this should be considered as mainstream 
thinking and a popular view at least in some parts of academia. It is associated with 
an ostentatiously demonstrated lack of trust in public authorities, politicians, and 
democratically elected representatives who hold governmental positions. They 
are being denied (stripped from the authority) to implement reforms in higher 
education, or as boldly declared by one of the experts, “Polish political class has 
no title to implement such changes [in higher education –authors] as it was in the 
Netherlands” or “Democratic government has no legitimacy to do anything it wants” 
(KRASP). So, in this context, a natural question arrives as to the time needed for the 
national government to be trusted by academia. It is a good point because Poland 
became a democratic country in 1989, and if academics, the elites of the country, 
have no trust in democratically elected institutions, then who will? 
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The experts were sharply split over this issue, and some claim that it is not about 
trust; it is about the privilege of self-governance. The academics simply do not like 
to be told what to do by the public authority and do not want to be accountable 
to anyone outside of academia. They apply the notion of academic freedom to 
protect their corporative or professional privileges. Others say that one must 
take into account that a great number of academics remember communist times, 
when reducing the scope of academic self-governance was one of the political 
instruments used to fight against academia in Poland. There are various ways to 
explain this phenomenon, but there is no doubt that many academics simply got 
used to enjoying democratic privileges that allowed them to influence institutional 
and departmental policy. They provide them certain (often only symbolic) power 
and prestige. Even some experts who are known for their conservative views told 
us directly that “university can be only a democratic and self-governing institution; 
otherwise there will be no university.” This statement expressed by one of the key 
and most influential figures in Polish higher education could be shocking for many, 
but it says something about the type of political challenge that needs to be faced in 
order to reform university governance model in Poland. 
In our view, one of the most important obstacles in modernization of the 
university governance model is that parts of the academic community in 
Poland have not noticed or do not want to notice that the world outside the 
university has undergone significant changes. Poland is a free, stable, and 
democratic country in which there is no serious argument that justifies 
treating academics as a particularly vulnerable group whose freedom to 
research and teach is particularly threatened. 
6.4. Barriers of university development in Poland
Reforms of university governance in Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal aimed 
to liberate universities from restrictions that limit their managerial capacity. So the 
experts were asked to identify the main obstacles to enabling Polish universities 
to make the best possible use of their assets and to develop their full capacity. 
The experts identified two main types of barriers that cause large disadvantages 
for academic institutions in Poland. They are internal and external barriers. 
Experts were sharply divided over which of them is bigger and more damaging to 
universities, although for the purpose of this research, this makes no difference. 
We investigate both types of obstacles trying to determine whether the reforms 
implemented in the reference countries could provide a good remedy for the 
problems of Polish universities. 
The first type of obstacle is an external corset of detailed regulations. 
The interviews left no doubts that higher education in Poland is over-regulated. 
The public authorities do not trust academic managers, who struggle with endless 
numbers of pointless regulations. The experts widely agreed that Polish universities 
desperately need more financial and organizational freedom. One of the main 
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reasons for university underperformance in research and education and other 
(contracted) activities is the need to comply with numerous regulations that 
serve no purpose. The experts understand that the system of higher education 
in Poland is comprised of 450 extremely different HE institutions, but the higher 
education policy needs to recognize the great internal diversity within the system. 
Public policy can no longer be made in a “one size fits all” manner, and it requires 
a “tailor-made approach,” at least for some types of higher education institutions. 
Experts agree that research universities are in the first line among those that 
deserve the greatest trust from public authorities. The reforms in the reference 
countries have at least one common goal — to increase financial and organizational 
autonomy — and the experts interviewed point out that it should also be the case 
in Poland. An extensive number of detailed regulations in higher education are 
a good proxy of the lack of trust that the government demonstrates toward higher 
education institutions. So far, we have underlined that the academic community 
has openly declared a lack of trust toward public authorities, but public authorities 
seem to demonstrate similar attitudes toward academia. And according to the 
experts, it is getting only worse and worse. Good examples are provided in the 
recent amendments to LHE that were implemented in 2010. They demanded that 
public universities run a separate accounting system for non-public money, and they 
prohibited using bank saving deposits for public money. This is completely irrational, 
and experts also say that this kind of regulation works against universities, but they 
have no option but to comply. 
In all the reference countries, public policy was meant to change the legal status 
of universities in order to extend their autonomy, or at least (e.g., Portugal) 
universities were given options to decide what suits them best. Polish experts 
suggest that it is not legal status that blocks the development of universities but 
detailed regulations that restrict universities. Instead of changing the legal status of 
universities, they propose to relax (or even lift) financial regulations that are in the 
following legal acts: the law of public funding, public tendering act, and the higher 
education act. Experts were enthusiastic about this idea; however, they also pointed 
out that some regulations have to stay to conform with the strict rules of spending 
of the EU structural funds. 
Putting my university outside the law of public finance would make my job as 
rector much easier.
Sorting out simple stuff requires three times more time than my neighbors 
from private HEIs. It takes them three days while I need an epoch because my 
capacity is limited by regulations. It is all because we want equal rules for the 
entire system of higher education, and public authority has no trust in us.
It is impossible or hard to achieve in the short term, as experts suggest, to begin 
with relaxing public funding of higher education. Experts who have had solid 
managerial experience in university business prefer to have at least multiyear 
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lump-sum budgets rather than the existing one year line-item budgets. It is hard to 
develop managerial capacity when you can only administrate university budgets. 
Rectors want to have more financial freedom because this critical managerial 
feature would allow them to exercise real institutional leadership. Concluding this 
part, experts agree that Polish universities need more financial freedom, as existing 
regulations largely limit the managerial capacity of rectors. Both the reforms in the 
reference countries as well as experts’ knowledge and experience leave no doubts 
that greater autonomy for Polish universities is critically needed. There is also little 
doubt that this idea would be warmly welcomed by rectors of public universities, 
who are a very powerful group in higher education in Poland.
The second type of obstacle has a purely internal character. It is the university 
governance model that reduces the capacity of university management. Not all 
the experts were equally convinced that university governance is a barrier; some 
prefer to say that it does create certain (necessary) limits. This linguistic difference 
hides two extremely different points of view on the university governance model 
in Poland, which was boldly reflected in the experts’ opinions. They are sometimes 
contradictory on very fundamental issues.
Let us begin by explaining that internal barriers are not similar in all types of 
universities. Formally speaking, the framework of governance model in public 
universities is defined on the national level. But as normative institutionalism 
exposes (see: March & Olsen 1984, 1989), these regulations are a subject of 
cultural interpretation in a university community that has its own deeply rooted 
values, norms, and routine behaviors. According to the experts, they are much 
more harmful in so-called traditional well-established universities than in so-
called professional universities, which are monolithic, centralized, and more 
professionally oriented (medical universities, economics universities (business 
schools), technical universities, etc.). Most universities, depending of their type, 
can interpret (accommodate) and apply these regulations. In regards to managerial 
capacity, traditional, well-established universities have the most difficulty in 
handling the regulations. Experts note that big universities are loosely coupled 
organizations with a federation of departments, which can effectively develop their 
own institutional research and educational policies. The stronger the department 
is, the more autonomous/rebellious it becomes in regards to the central university 
management. Traditional universities are more internally oriented organizations in 
which academics play a more important role, and they desire academic freedom, 
institutional autonomy (often in the autarkic sense), and the right balance of internal 
power and democratic self-governance. One of the experts characterizes it in the 
following way:
(…) from one side university is a corporation of scholars. Professors rule 
university, but a dangerous thing is (…) that professors easily manipulate 
students. A pointer are poor students, who in 5 years time will leave university 
and they — in fact — elect the university rector (…). This is the worst possible 
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model because on the one hand there is a strong position of professors, on the 
other instrumental use of democracy which was introduced in the beginning of 
1990s only because we were leaving an undemocratic, communist system.
 
On the other side, there are professional universities that seem to be more aware 
of their social and professional accountability. The genesis of these universities 
is different because most of them were established to provide education for 
professionals on a high level. It does have a profound influence on governing 
practices and the way universities comply with the framework of governance that is 
given in the law of higher education. It provides evidence for normative institutional 
theory of institutional change but also raises a challenge for policy makers and 
reforms. Therefore, in elaborating on reforms of university governance, we have 
to keep in mind that in fact we refer to diverse governance models at universities 
in Poland despite a uniform legal framework. It warns us about the importance 
of tradition and institutional culture in particular in well-established and old 
universities. One of the experts explains these two types of academic institutions by 
two perspectives of looking at universities and their role in society. 
There are two perspectives that we can look at universities. The first is 
socio-cultural perspective in which it is important that universities exist and 
therefore society finance their performance without actually caring paying 
attention what they actually do. The second perspective is more pragmatic 
because it expects university to justify their social usefulness. I am in favor of 
the latter but I also know that I am in minority. 
The interviewed experts acknowledge that well-established universities have 
enjoyed a long academic tradition, and they tend to be conservative toward 
accepting modern managerial novelties that are averse to the ideas of self-
governance, collegiality, and institutional democracy. More importantly, they 
are associated with a strong notion of internal accountability to the academic 
community. And therefore, they show strong resistance toward any form of 
opening universities to the external world or increasing their social and political 
accountability. There is a big difference between universities and professional 
universities because the latter were regarded as being more immediately relevant 
for meeting social needs “ while the more traditional universities are deemed to 
be transparent and accountable through measurable outcomes. The interviewed 
experts, who have both professional and managerial backgrounds in professional 
or traditional universities, see that difference. And it should be recognized in policy 
making because there are clearly two different types of institutions run by different 
managerial logic. Therefore, it needs to be underlined that so-called “departmental 
anarchy,” or as one of experts dub it, “the republic of loosely coupled departments,” 
applies only to traditional well-established universities, and as mentioned above, 
does not seem to be a big problem in professional universities. So, toppling would 
have a great impact on the first type of universities but would offer little change in 
the second. However, the experts admit that conflicts between rectors and heads of 
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departments and schools are not very rare, but they are often caused by a clash of 
personalities or private issues that have nothing to do with university management. 
6.5. Transfer of power from collegial bodies to university 
managers
An aspect of reform that sparked the most controversy among the experts and 
obviously the most extreme responses is the change in the balance of power at 
universities. As mentioned above, the experts were sharply split about democratic 
notions at universities. We assume that the opinion of the experts partly reflects 
the mood within academia, but we are more interested in reconstructing their lines 
of arguments than measuring the popularity of various concepts. Experts largely 
agree that Polish academics got used to thinking of universities as democratic 
organizations, whose integral characteristic is democratic self-governance. 
Therefore, any political attempts aimed at changing this would be risky. Limiting the 
scope of self-governance at universities would spark protests in academia, who 
would accuse the government of authoritarian ambitions. They would often 
recall the communist state that also made several initiatives to reduce the scope 
of university self-governance. Regardless of the motives behind it, any political 
attempts to strip collegial bodies of their managerial power would be treated by 
academia as an unprecedented attack on the freedom of science. Many people 
still believe that freedom of science can be effectively protected only by the 
self-governing rules of the academic community. The experts, based on their 
experience, see such conservative approaches as typical for “old professors,” 
who remember the communist times, and for them, self-governance of the 
university can have both an sentimental character (due to historical reasons) but 
also a highly pragmatic one (because it guarantees senior academics a sense of 
power and influence on the university). It must be said that some experts see 
the stressing of fundamental academic values as a pragmatic tactic directed to 
blocking modernization initiatives that clearly strip university oligarchs of their 
power, influence, and institutional privileges. “It is all they have, so they are not 
going to give it away cheaply.” Therefore, some experts (others have a completely 
different opinion) recommend giving up institutional democracy, or university self-
governance, by stripping collegial bodies of their managerial power. According to 
their views, the senate and boards of departments should keep strictly academic 
competencies.
Experts have no doubts that the managerial power of collegial bodies provides 
the community of scholars a sense of subjectivity at the university, and reforms 
of governance implemented in Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal can been 
seen as violations of important parts of academia. They also agree that this is 
a unique privilege for academics, and it would be hard to compensate them for such 
a loss of prestige and influence on institutional policy, without which they would 
automatically become just ordinary employees of the university. This mixture of 
emotion and power suggests that some professors would fight for the democratic 
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university to the bitter end. Reformers and policy makers need to know that 
stripping collegial bodies of their managerial power goes far beyond the issue of 
university governance and touches the most fundamental values of the university, 
such as freedom of science and university autonomy. Due to historical reasons, 
these issues are extremely sensitive for the Polish academia. Experts are very 
divided over the issue of stripping collegial university bodies of their managerial 
power and transferring it to individual university managers, such as rectors and 
heads of departments of smaller units. This split has ideological roots. It stems 
from radically different views of the university, which we tried to shed light on 
earlier. Those experts who believe that the university is a political actor, in which 
freedom and self-governance are more important than effectiveness and social 
accountability, seem to favor collegiality over managerial canon. Others, who see 
universities performing in a highly competitive environment, prefer a managerial 
regime over collegial tradition. If the experts are split over such fundamental issues 
as the idea of the university, so will be academia. One may expect that the political 
debate that would accompany reforms of university governance will be conducted 
on big ideas. And one way or the other, it must address the most fundamental 
question about what kind of university we want in Poland and what ends it should 
serve. Who should it serve — academia or society? But also, reforms need to 
address the issue of how managerialism at universities can be a threat to academic 
values. Are these academic values not being seriously threatened in Austria, the 
Netherlands, or Portugal? If no, why are Polish universities so different from those 
in the reference countries? 
6.6. Entrepreneurial model of university
The debate about the university is fundamental and significant for public policy, 
but in real terms, it could have very practical consequences for university 
governance and management. The reforms in the reference countries reveal a clear 
direction toward a more entrepreneurial model of university governance, which 
rests on institutional leadership and the principles of New Public Management. 
The interviewed experts were asked to evaluate Polish universities in regards to 
reforms implemented in Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal and to provide 
their recommendations for changes (if needed). The entrepreneurial university can 
be characterized by a strong managerial position of the rector, who is appointed 
by an external body though open call, enjoys significant managerial freedom, and 
does not have to rely on the good/bad will of collegial bodies at various layers 
of university governance. The experts acknowledge that Polish universities are 
far from being entrepreneurial, though some of them do not see it as the best 
option for academic institutions. What is more important is that the experts often 
underscore that existing regulations allow universities to be entrepreneurial, 
but universities just do not take this opportunity. In other words, they suggest 
that the law of higher education provides institutional space for institutional 
entrepreneurialism, and there is no need to change regulations if university 
culture remains the same.“The amendment to the law of higher education sets an 
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opportunity to strengthen the position of rectors by selecting candidates through 
open call or by being appointed by the university senate selection committee.” 
The article 72 LHE says that “university rector can be appointed through election or 
selection,” but it leaves it to the universities to determine the way they choose their 
rectors. Article 72 says: “the way of appointment of rectors, formal requirements 
that need to be fulfilled by running candidates as well as election/selection 
procedure are to be regulated by universities statutes.”
Despite this legal opportunity, there was no single institution that decided to 
be more adventurous and innovative in appointing rectors. What is more, some 
universities totally ruled out, even as a hypothetical path, the appointment of 
rectors (in the future) from their statutes. This gives food for thought about 
academic attitudes toward a more entrepreneurial model of selecting rectors. 
Instead, they use the traditional model of indirect democracy, in which rectors are 
elected by collegiums of electors (comprised of various university employees) and 
in which the senior academics hold the majority, with no single representative of 
external stakeholders. In other words, appointing rectors — in the eyes of academia 
— remains an internal issue for university employees to sort out in a democratic 
way. The experts tend to agree that democratic election of universities’ rectors 
holds many drawbacks and needs to be replaced by a more merit-based appointing 
system. Even those experts who clearly favor the concept of the university as 
a democratic organization would accept a new path of selecting rectors by an 
external body (such as a board of trustees) if they have representatives of the 
university community in an adequate proportion. All the experts share the opinion 
that economic and social costs of running campaigns at universities are damaging 
for universities. And it needs to be underscored that the interviews were conducted 
a few weeks after such campaigns at Polish universities, so memories were fresh. 
The experts give a number of examples of scandalous incidents that happened 
during campaigns in internal elections at their institutions. These incidents largely 
undermined the social authority and the prestige of academic institutions in society 
at large. On the other hand, unless one of the most prestigious Polish universities 
decides to apply an innovative way of choosing its rector, other universities will not. 
The idea of electing rectors by employees or keeping all this institutional 
politics in such a big enterprise as university is just absurd.
Some experts were very critical about the managerial power of rectors under the 
existing law of higher education, claiming that rectors have completely no power to 
motivate senior academics to deliver value for the money. 
The system is based on worship of academic degrees and titles that at 
a certain stage of an academic career effectively prohibit university managers 
to make their employees accountable for their performance. 
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In Poland you cannot lay off a university professor even if he is lazy, does 
not do any research at all, and her/his teaching isbelow-standard, unless he 
commits a crime. It is frustrating for rectors like me. 
The interviewed experts acknowledge that Polish universities have no option but 
to follow the direction of reforms, but some of them underline that “the academic 
community is not ready yet for such radical changes,” or “reforms need to take 
into consideration the uniqueness of the Polish context.” Other experts presented 
completely different approaches, claiming that there is no rationale behind putting 
off reforms for the unforeseen future.
6.7. Social accountability of the university
Polish universities are inward oriented because university management is 
accountable to the university senate that represents the academic community. 
The reforms in Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal turned the university upside 
down and made the university more accountable to wider society. The reforms 
in the reference countries were meant to build stable partnerships with various 
external stakeholders, in particular in the free market and in the public realm. 
Building such strong ties with the world outside strengthens the position of 
universities and legitimizes raising public financial support for universities.
Polish universities have recently experienced strong criticism due to a general 
feeling of their underperformance in research (measured by a dissatisfactory 
position in the international university rankings) and in education (major 
dissatisfaction from businesses about the knowledge and skills offered by higher 
education graduates). Leaving aside how much this claim of underperformance 
is legitimate, there is an unfavorable atmosphere for universities. To add insult 
to injury, Poland will go through deep demographic changes in the future and 
experience a sharp drop in the number of students. This can be an extremely 
difficult time for universities because the structure of their budgets largely relies 
on income from education services. Dta shows (GUS 2014:182) that 77.5 percent 
(in 2013) of budgets at public universities come from teaching services on various 
levels (bachelor, master, doctoral, and professional courses). A lack of public 
accountability, lower numbers of students, and growing pressure to implement 
austerity plans in the public realm might seriously affect public spending on higher 
education. Polish universities lack public accountability and a stable partnership 
with external stakeholders. The experts fully share this assumption and also see it 
as a problem. 
The recent amendment in LHE installs a legal framework to establish convents, 
external bodies comprised of representatives of external stakeholders. 
The amendment only opens the legal opportunity for establishing an external 
university body, but it neither ascribes it any serious role nor makes it mandatory 
for universities. This soft approach resulted in only a few universities deciding to set 
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up such bodies. One of the experts, whose university made this adventurous step, 
admits that it has no role in governance; it only serves as a communication platform 
between different external stakeholders. One of the advantages for the university 
is that all these various stakeholders began to understand that the university is 
surrounded by a wide range of different (often contradictory) expectations and 
must put up with them. In other words, the convent helps university management 
understand the expectations of employers, private sector organizations, and local 
government, but external stakeholders can also learn that universities perform 
in such a complicated environment. In general, universities do not see reasons 
to establish external bodies, and those that do establish them ascribe symbolic 
functions with no specific role in governance. It reflects the “closed” character of 
public universities in Poland as well as inward driven accountability. As said before, 
internal accountability provides the academic community a sense of subjectivity but 
builds a wall between university and society outside of the ivory tower. In Poland, 
ties between universities and society are fragile, and universities still resemble the 
ivory tower. Experts have similar observations and jointly add that this cultural 
problem has historical roots in the communist past. Communist authorities were 
very suspicious about the closed academic community. So under popular slogans, 
such as “opening university to people of different social background” or “bring 
it closer to working class and peasants,” they tried any possible way to engage 
the university in their ideological revolution. And before 1989, the Polish higher 
education system was an elite system in Martin’s Trow (1973) typology, in which 
accountability was not an issue at all. There was no need to build bridges between 
universities and society or respond to economic interests. All these factors have 
contributed to a highly institutionalized closed university culture in Poland that 
rests on mistrust of the world outside the walls of the ivory tower. Aiming to reform 
university governance and building social and political accountability of academic 
institutions reforms cannot focus on the legal aspects but should challenge the 
existing university culture. The latter seems to be a more challenging policy goal 
and may require years. It was not an easy task in the reference countries, and 
Portugal still has much to do in this respect. Present reforms of higher education 
in Poland have made a small step forward, but as elaborated earlier, university 
convents were introduced only as an option without any role in governance. 
Based on our experience in research and policy analysis, we think that this approach 
is too soft to increase the public accountability of public universities in Poland. 
A similar case can be found in appointing rectors. Due to a closed university 
culture and other factors explained earlier, one Polish university has postponed the 
selection of rectors through an open call for at least another four years. In addition, 
candidates from outside this particular university are not particularly welcome 
(if allowed by university statutes) to join the race for the rector’s chair. As it was 
gently explained by one of interviewed experts, it would not be well taken if an 
outsider ran. ”This candidate would have absolutely no chance to win anyway.” 
Boards of trustees (under different names) are well rooted in Austria and the 
Netherlands, and even in Portugal the presence of external stakeholders (in the 
university council) is accepted, although only on a marginal basis. Our experts show 
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great enthusiasm for the idea of boards of trustees. Ironically, their enthusiasm 
only partly stems from the need for social and political accountability of public 
universities and partly because boards of trustees would strength rector positions. 
Boards of trustees are seen not only as a bridge to society but also as a source of 
stable authority that supports institutional policy run by university management. 
Rectors would be better managers if they were accountable to professionals 
instead of internal stakeholders, who are more interested in preserving their own, 
individual, or organizational interests rather than the university‘s interests. 
Rectors should get managerial instruments but also should be accountable 
as a manager to the university senate in regards to research and teaching 
performance but also to board of trustees in regards to managerial issues. 
Experts show no fear of boards of trustees; to the contrary, most claim that 
they can bring universities closer to the needs of society or at least help them 
to understand these needs. But some of them warn against an unduly monetary 
approach. This mistake was made by hospitals’ boards of trustees, which are 
generally too narrow-minded in evaluating hospitals’ performance and in 
overlooking the hospitals’ social mission.
A board of trustees cannot be comprised of managers only (…) it cannot be 
simply too focused on financial issues.
 The issue of social accountability of public universities is almost a taboo in public 
debates about universities in Poland. Slogans that refer to the social mission of the 
university, the social responsibility of the university, or simply the social role of the 
university cannot be translated into policy and an institutional setting. Some experts 
said directly that Polish universities do not want to be externally accountable 
because university senates do not want to lose their power. And those who demand 
social accountability of public universities are mostly individuals from outside 
academia who are being largely blocked by academia from having an influence on 
higher education. The problem of university accountability of Polish universities was 
perfectly described by one of our experts in following way: 
From the past we took over university as a prestigious and noble institution 
which emanates certain ethos but it does not hold any accountability to 
society for its performance.
This impact of history and tradition on present institutional culture is call path 
dependency, but for the future of Polish universities, this logic of consequences 
could be damaging. Taxpayers in Poland, as in other European countries, will 
express a growing pressure to reduce public spending, including spending on higher 
education. It can put universities in a very difficult situation for at least two major 
reasons: (a) Polish higher education is largely underfunded in comparison to the 
average of the EU27 and (b) the structure of R&D is not well-balanced (60% public 
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funding and 40% private funding) and completely opposite to the dominant model 
in knowledge-intensive economies in the EU27. We have reasons to believe that 
both the level and structure of R&D funding will remain low and dominated by public 
support. Lack of transparency and accountability leave universities in the hands of 
academia. It remains a safe, often comfortable and autonomous institution that is 
likely to fail in convincing taxpayers (or politicians on their behalf) to increase public 
support for universities. But according to research, without significant increase of 
public support for R&D (up to 1% of GDP), it is hard to expect a bigger engagement 
of private funding in the sector. It is in the deepest interest of universities to be 
more accountable to society because in financially turbulent times, taxpayers 
would never increase financial support for institutions that lack transparency and 
public accountability. Similar problems have been experienced in most European 
countries because the time when the welfare state gave its unconditional support to 
universities to keep intellectual space for unhampered thinking is already a thing of 
the past. A number of scholars, including Marek Kwiek (2001), have announced the 
end of university as we know it.
In the reference countries, representatives of external stakeholders were invited 
to participate in university governance because they could contribute to better 
university governance, help to build a bridge between university and society, 
and legitimize public spending on public universities. The institutional theory 
of path dependency can help to explain the difficulty of changing the deeply 
institutionalized closed culture of university governance, but it would fail to justify 
(legitimize) the increase of public spending on university research and development. 
6.8. How to reform universities in Poland
The interviews with experts show that, at least in some parts of the academic 
community, there is a growing feeling that the existing model of university 
governance does not fit with the growing challenges produced by the knowledge-
based economy. It is not necessarily the dominant feeling, but the experts claim that 
it is probably the case. A similar situation was diagnosed in the reference countries, 
in which reforms were initiated by the governments. Of course, a lack of pressure 
from inside academia and a lack of feeling that something has to be changed makes 
the process of implementing a new model of university governance a tough policy 
goal. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with the performance of higher education 
is growing outside of academia. In public discourse, Polish universities seem to 
be divorced from reality, poorly ranked in international university rankings, and 
extremely closed. Politicians love to complain about university performance, despite 
the fact that most of them have no idea about research evaluations, accreditation 
systems, and international university rankings. Nevertheless, social and political 
trust in universities in Poland does not help universities to get more funding from 
public or private sources. The crisis of trust in universities (or even in all facets 
of higher education) is clearly visible, and universities cannot ignore it. We can 
grumble that public discourse is largely emotional and dominated by populist 
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arguments that serve domestic short-term party politics. If we acknowledge the 
crisis, however, we cannot ignore its influence on the policy agenda. 
The aim of this project was to point out a direction of reforms of university 
governance, propose alternatives on the institutional level, and provide some 
advice for the implementation process. Both a large body of literature (e.g., 
Kogan, Bauer, Bleiklie, & Henkel 1988; Gornitzka, Kogan, &Amaral 2007) and 
the experience of the authors show that a process of policy implementation can 
be long, difficult, hostile, and will be associated with political tensions. Reforms 
in the reference countries (but also in most of the EU27 countries) demonstrate 
the direction of change, but in the analyzed countries there is a large amount 
of evidence to be drawn upon. Experts have doubts that university governance 
reforms could ever come from the bottom up. A few of them underscore that 
one of strategic documents (elaborated on earlier) was produced and officially 
accepted by the Associations of Rectors (KRAP), although others pointed out 
that the document is on a very abstract level that almost everybody can agree 
with. The devil is in the detail. In other words, it can serve as a soft guideline for 
future reforms in higher education, but it has limited capacity in regards to policy 
making. In addition, analyses of higher education reforms (e.g., Huisman, Maassen, 
Neave 2007; Cloete et al. 2002; Gornitzka, Kogan, Amaral eds. 2007) show that 
universities demonstrate big resistance to any alternations in their governance 
model. Based on the recent experience from the modernization of university 
governance proposal (as an option), Poland hardly seems to be an exception. 
The interviewed experts, who all have outstanding experience in higher education 
policy and management, warn us that reforming university governance and 
the introduction of the managerial canon to academic institutions will be highly 
unpopular among academics, in particular those who are well settled in the current 
system. Accountability of universities might be undoubtedly an important goal for 
politicians, but it is not currently an issue for the majority of academics. Lack of 
accountability does not affect their everyday work.
Previous experiences of reforming higher education, including universities in 
Poland, reveal two relevant regularities. First, they changed the system in fairly 
similar ways. However, the international literature (e.g., Teichler 2007: 99–107) 
on higher education policy suggests paying greater attention to diversification. 
Higher education institutions in Poland are so different that they require different 
measures for different types of institutions, particularly when addressing 
prestigious, well-established universities. Secondly, universities in Poland 
demonstrate strong resistance toward softly implemented reforms. If they have an 
option, they would rather postpone or even avoid reforms at any cost unless they 
bring immediate financial savings (e.g., abolishing students’ paper indexes). 
We stand on the position that reforms should be approached with an understanding 
of the institutional diversity of academic institutions in Poland. We believe that 
governance reforms need to be implemented individually, only in universities that 
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are ready to change their governance model for greater financial and organizational 
autonomy. Not every higher education institution will be interested in extending 
institutional autonomy and implementing managerial canon; therefore, we believe 
that reforms need to be “tailor made” rather than “one size fits all.” 
By ordinance you can only regulate monolithic structures. 
It is probably unrealistic to think that the government can offer universities 
additional funding. But as one of experts says, 
However, it is sad that the amount of money for universities is unlikely to 
grow but (…) we [rectors: DA&BJ] are often trapped in regulations which work 
the same at universities and firms that builds roads. This is a fundamental 
misunderstanding.
The ministry should begin negotiations with individual universities that potentially 
might be interested in switching to a more entrepreneurial governance model. 
The only way to succeed is to offer them concrete benefits that they otherwise 
will never have access to. Here we have a dilemma because the ones most likely to 
accept such a shift are the professional universities, such as economics universities, 
technical universities, or medical universities. On the other hand, The University 
of Warsaw and Jagiellonian University, the oldest and best performing academic 
institutions, possess the greatest authority in academia. One of experts point 
out that authority in academia is the most valuable source of power. It applies 
to both outstanding individuals as well as exceptional institutions with great 
reputations and great academic tradition. In this purely non-egalitarian society, 
prominent individuals and prestigious institutions are undoubtedly powerful points 
of reference. One of the experts provides us with a story about implementing 
the mandatory State’s Accreditation Committee (PKA) that initially faced strong 
opposition from some universities (departments). But university senates in 
Warsaw and Cracow decided to comply with the new rules that effectively reduce 
institutional autonomy of universities. Since then, all of the universities accept 
PKA and mandatory accreditation of teaching programs. An opposite situation 
took place in Austria, where the major universities have not agreed to undergo 
accreditation procedures run by the state’s agency, which has had a big impact on 
other higher education institutions. 
There is also another argument to make governance reforms more “tailor made” for 
leading universities only. These universities are by far the best performing academic 
institutions in Poland, and they simply deserve more trust, which translates 
to financial and organizational autonomy. Many studies on changes in higher 
education show that they occur by diffusion and imitation. This pattern has been 
confirmed by one of our experts, who described it in the following way:
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 The least prestigious the university is, the bigger the feeling of insecurity 
about implementing new mechanisms in institutional settings. 
These academic institutions always look up to more prestigious universities and try 
to follow their path, or at least try to imitate it. In short, there is a strong argument 
to begin university governance reform with a few selected academic institutions. 
It still remains open weather it should be the top professional universities, which 
are more accountable through professional organizations and less embedded into 
traditional academic culture, or whether it should be the most prestigious traditional 
universities (Warsaw and Cracow). At this point, the first option appears to be more 
feasible. But it is the traditional universities that really need a change. 
The interviewed experts do not show much optimism about the prospect of 
modernization of university governance. Referring to the reforms implemented in 
the three analyzed countries, the experts are in agreement that implementation will 
be a challenge but not mission impossible, although one of the experts confesses 
(based on his experience), “Rectors in Poland are not ready for such a change.” 
In our view, there is no need to postpone reforms until rectors or the academic 
community at large is ready to accept a new model of university governance. 
Reforms in higher education — in particular reforms of university governance — 
spark controversy and build strong opposition, which would include academics 
of exceptional professional authority. Having said so, we believe that the Ministry 
of Science and Higher Education should approach leading Polish universities 
(professional or traditional), offering them greater financial and organizational 
autonomy in return for implementing an entrepreneurial model of university 
governance. Top universities can benefit the most from having greater financial and 
organization autonomy, but they also deserve greater autonomy, as they operate in 
a highly competitive international environment. This new and pragmatic policy shift 
can be extremely beneficial for both universities and the government, but it can 
only be built on mutual trust.
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